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INTRODUCTION
The rise of the modem corporation has brought a con-
centration of economic power which can compete on
equal terms with the modem state-economic power
versus political power, each strong in its own field. The
state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation,
while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful,
makes every effort to avoid such regulation. Where its
own interests are concerned, it even attempts to domi-
nate the state.'
[One area] in which the future might see more active
enforcement from [the Department of Justice] than in the
recent past [is fraudulent] procurement of patents.2
Corporate abuse of economic power has long been difficult to con-
trol.3 However, in recent times, this problem is more apparent. Due to
the growing competitive importance of modem technology, there is now
great incentive for corporations to obtain patents at any cost, causing
patentees to frequently risk engaging in fraudulent or inequitable conduct
before the Patent Office.4 Unfortunately, patent fraud is even more diffi-
cult to detect and remedy than most other forms of corporate economic
misconduct. The Patent Office does not have adequate resources to pre-
vent fraud.5 Rather than the ordinary pursuit of patent office interfer-
1 A. A. BERLE, JR. & G. C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 357 (1932).
2 Donald I. Baker & Richard H. Sayler, U.S. Justice Department Patent-Antitrust Pol-
icy: The Hazards of Changing Policies on Distant Horizons, 365 PLI/PAT 105, 159 (1993).
3 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandal-
ized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MicH. L. REv. 386, 390 (1981)
(arguing that corporate criminality is "uniquely concealable").
4 For a description of activities that constitute fraud on the PTO and the difficult nature
of proof of such conduct, see infra notes 51, 63, and 137.
5 In the original Patent Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 323, the granting of
patents was made a purely clerical function, involving no examination on the merits, even
though fraudulent excess was a ground for refusing to enforce the grant. Today, "[blecause of
the immense volume of patent applications, the PTO [continues to be] necessarily limited in
the time it may spend on ascertaining the facts necessary to judge patentability. Moreover, it
has no testing facilities of its own." 7 JOAN 0. VON KALINOwSKI, AwrrrrusT LAWS AND
TRADE REGuLATION, § 59.05(2)(b)(iii), at 59-67 (1992). As a result, the PTO decided to with-
draw from any policing activity. "In a Notice dated September 8, 1988, the PTO Commis-
sioner indicated that it would no longer investigate and reject original or reissue applications
under 37 C.F.R. §1.56. The expressed reason for this new 'hands-off policy was that the PTO
is not an appropriate forum for determining intent to mislead. Thus we may expect, if any-
thing, that the frequency and intensity of inequitable conduct litigation in the courts will in-
crease." ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTs AND THE FEDERAL CIRcurr § 9.5(a), at 356 (3d ed.
1994). Consequently, "[the] requirement [of disclosure to the Patent Office] has grown in
importance because of the highly technical nature of the subject matter of many patent applica-
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ences or litigation over validity in response to licensing or infringement
suits, the prohibitive costs of patent litigation often tempt potential cor-
porate competitors into collusion through settlements involving cross-li-
censing or other provisions.6 If fraudulently obtained patents go
unchallenged there is much to be gained. Even more than fifty years
ago, it was clear that in many important segments of our national econ-
omy "the privilege accorded by the patent monopoly [was being] shame-
fully abused [as] a device to control whole industries, to suppress
competition, to restrict output, to enhance prices, to suppress inventions
and to discourage inventiveness."7
Criminal or civil actions may be brought by the Department of Jus-
tice to remedy patent antitrust violations, but there are fiscal, political,
and practical limits to that agency's capacity to investigate, prosecute,
and obtain relief for fraudulent procurement of patents.8 The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) also has investigatory and remedial authority
in antitrust matters. 9 It can order a complete array of essentially equita-
ble remedies, including relief designed to correct non-competitive condi-
tions in an industry or market,10 but it is also apparently without
adequate resources to police patent applications."
tions, the difficulties inherent in searching the worldwide technical literature, and the unique
knowledge that the applicant may hold." Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d
931, 940 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990). See also Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338
U.S. 318, 319 (1949) ("By reason of the nature of an application for patent, the relationship of
attorneys to the patent office requires the highest degree of candor and good faith. In its
relation to applicants, the office.., must rely upon their integrity and deal with them in a spirit
of trust and confidence .... "); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945) ("Those who have applications pending with the Patent
Office or who are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to report
to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in is-
sue."). Effective March 16, 1992, new Patent Office rules clarify and reinforce the duties of
disclosure, good faith, and candor. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997).
6 Although "[it] is difficult to estimate the total cost of repeatedly re-litigating patent
validity on similar patents [one] study commissioned in 1989 estimates that the median cost of
patent litigation in the United States is over $300,000." Peter C. Ku & William L. LaFuze,
Mooting Patent Invalidity: Justiciability and the Case of Cardinal Chemical, 20 RUTrERs
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 539, 541 n.6 (1994) (citations omitted).
7 FiNAL REPORT OF THE TNEC, S. Doc. No. 77-35, at 36 (1st Sess. 1941).
8 These limits have become even more apparent in recent years. "At the end of fiscal
year 1989, for example, the Antitrust division employed a total of 458 staff, or 425 fewer staff
(about half) of the 883 staff it had at the end of fiscal year 1980." Changes in Antitrust
Enforcement Policies and Activities of the Justice Department, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1495, at S-27 tbl.2.2 (Dec. 13, 1990); see also infra note 26 (on the effects of
politics on antitrust enforcement).
9 See generally Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C §41-58 (1994).
10 See id. at §5(b).
11 Recently, for only the first time since the FTC was created in 1914, did the informa-
tion obtained in an antitrust investigation initiated by the FTC result in the reexamination of a
patent by the Patent Office. See Antitrust Investigation Leads to Biochemistry Patent Reexam-
ination, FTC: WATCH, Dec. 21, 1992, No. 380, at 1. In the mid-1980s, the FTC opened inves-
1998]
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Nevertheless, the FTC and the federal courts have authority to re-
quire, among other forms of relief, compulsory licensing of patents to
"pry open to competition a market that has been closed by . . .illegal
restraints."' 12 Compulsory licensing decrees have been common, there-
fore, where corporations have misused patent rights in restraint of
trade. 13 Where the door to competition is closed as a result of the use of
fraudulently obtained patents, application of the corollary remedy of roy-
aly-free licensing would seem compelling. This is especially true given
both the lack of any equitable basis for claiming the rewards of invention
and the practical difficulty of proving the level of fraud on the part of
patentees and others usually necessary to invalidate patents. 14 Compul-
sory royalty-free licensing can be used to eliminate the present value of a
fraudulently obtained patent and to encourage the resumption of compet-
itive conditions with a promise of an eventual return to defendants of
control over licensing.t 5 Thus, patentees are not penalized as harshly.
with royalty-free licensing as they are with other available antitrust reme-
dies, such as patent cancellation or dedication, where all property rights
tigation into the monopolization (through patent fraud) alleged in that matter. The patent in
issue was for a method of mass-producing a form of the drug Interferon through DNA splicing
techniques. Rather than attempting to declare the patent invalid, the results of the investiga-
tion, including statements from prominent scientists, were passed along to the PTO. See id.
12 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947) (In addressing the
tying of salt products to leases of patented machines, the court stated that the goal of a suit in
equity is not to punish past transgression nor end specific illegal practices, but to open
markets.).
13 "[Many] courts have ordered compulsory licensing at a reasonable royalty." 3 RAY-
MOND C. NORDHAUS, PATa,'rr-ANrrRUST LAW, §104C-2 (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1989). Anti-
trust consent decrees which require partial divestiture, for example, will also occasionally
require mandatory patent licensing in order to improve the competitive condition of the pre-
acquisition marketplace. See, e.g., United States v. United Techs. Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 63,792 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. and Elec.
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Haw. 1973) (litigated judgment), aff d in part, rev'd in part, 518
F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Continental Oil Co., 72 F.T.C. 850 (1967). Consent decrees in
antitrust suits based on attempts to monopolize an industry through the use of patents often call
for defendants to issue even royalty-free licenses. See, e.g., United States v. Pitney-Bowes,
Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,235 (D. Conn. 1959).
Although the [Antitrust Division of the Justice Department] has been relatively un-
successful in obtaining [dedication] in contested cases, provisions concerning dedi-
cation and royalty-free licensing have frequently been accepted by defendants in
consent decrees. With the continued appearance of such provisions in consent de-
crees, the fact of their commonness may tend to overshadow [any constitutional
objections] to such an extent that the judiciary will feel less reluctant in the future to
decree such drastic relief in contested cases.
NoRDrAus, supra (citation omitted).
14 See Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co. v. Task Force Tips, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ind.
1994); Avco Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 84 (D. Mass. 1994); see also David P.
Cullen & Robert V. Vickers, Note, Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent, 29 GEO. WASH. L.
Rav. 110 (1960) (tracing the history of fraudulent procurement and pointing to the continuing
lack of standards to measure conduct before the Patent Office).
15 See infra note 230.
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are forever lost.' 6 These latter remedies are closely circumscribed by
constitutional law, and are infrequently deemed appropriate in antitrust
decrees.17
Despite its value in supporting a public policy that seeks to remedy
patent fraud,' 8 courts hearing Walker Process19 type antitrust suits do not
employ the compulsory royalty-free licensing remedy as often as ex-
pected, given the tone of antitrust jurisprudence in the 1960s.20 As sug-
gested earlier, the reason for this may lie, in general, in the cyclical,
political nature of the Justice Department's antitrust efforts,21 or in the
inevitable limits of agencies such as the FTC.22 The dearth of royalty-
16 See infra note 48 (describing the implications of cancellation).
17 See, e.g., infra note 128 and accompanying text.
18 Preventing the enforcement of fraudulently obtained patents serves the public interest
by protecting the integrity of the patent issuing process. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool
Co., 759 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
19 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (This
established the principle that patent fraud could serve as the basis for an antitrust claim and is
discussed at infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.).
20 For cases raising but denying Walker Process claims, see, for example, Glaverbel
Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg., 45 F.3d 1550 (Fed Cir. 1995); Carroll Touch, Inc. v.
Elector Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Technicon Instruments Corp. v.
Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849
F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir.
1984); E.I. duPont de Nemours v. Berkley & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1979); Norton
Co. v. Carborundum Co., 530 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1976); Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 530 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1976); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Medical Ind., Inc.,
516 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1975). See also ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTs AND THE FEDERAL
Cmcurr §9.5(a), at 355 (3d ed. 1994) (the [courts are] disinclined to uphold an inequitable
conduct defense in the absence of truly egregious conduct"); WnLuim C. HOLMES, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND ANTIRUST LAW §15.02 (1997). There are very few decisions which
have succeeded in imposing antitrust liability based upon the enforcement of fraudulently or
inequitably procured patents. See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562
F.2d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 1977) (same violation manifested intention... to the same degree as if
the original patent had been procured by fraud"); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddens &
Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 595 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972) (violation
of proscriptions against conflicts of interest involved "the same threat to the public interest as
actual fraud" upon the Patent Office); Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969); Arcade, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Co.,
No. CIV-1-88-141, 1991 WL 429344 (E.D. Tenn., Jun. 7, 1991); Conceptual Eng'g Assocs.,
Inc. v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262 (D.R.I. 1989); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
21 The years 1981 to 1988 have been described as "a period of strong enthusiasm for
protecting the interests and rewards of patentees," while the years 1989 to 1992 are thought of
as a period of "virtual silence and inaction on the patent front." Baker & Sayler, supra note 2,
at 120; see also infra notes 25, 31 and accompanying text.
22 Any administrative enforcement scheme that seeks to remove the benefits of the patent
system will naturally meet corporate resistance. Such resistance tends to be unusually effective
before administrative agencies for reasons that may be implied from the following quotation,
which appears in many critical discussions of regulatory commissions:
The [I.C.C.] is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular
clamor for a government supervision of railroads, at the same time that the supervi-
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free licensing decrees in Walker Process litigation may also result from
the fact that this remedy has most often been ordered in consent de-
crees.2 3 Consent decrees rarely articulate any specific justification for
remedies invoked, and, because they are essentially settlements, are
rarely reviewed or approved by the United States Supreme Court. Thus,
they leave the bench and bar with little sense of when the remedy should
be pursued in similarly litigated matters. 4 Regardless of the reasons, it
is fair to say that the growing incentive (and trend) toward inequitable
conduct before the Patent Office will not be impeded in any meaningful
way by historically mercurial, national antitrust enforcement policies.
Actually, antitrust enforcement in the United States during the twen-
tieth century may be divided into two distinct eras-the 1920-1980
"traditional" period and the post-1980 "modem" period.25 Patents were
sion is almost entirely normal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the
more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things ....
MARVEN H. BERNSTnIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 265 (1955)
(quoting a letter written by Richard Olney in 1892 to President Perkins of the Chicago, Bur-
lington and Quincy R.R.).
With regard to the FrC, in particular, a trend which began around 1970 and which contin-
ues to develop in the federal courts "appears to undermine the substantial authority of [that
agency]." Jeffrey H. Leibling, Judicial Usurpation of the F.T.C. 's Authority: A Return to the
Rule of Reason, 30 J. MARSrHALL L. REV. 283, 308 (citing Casewell 0. Hobbs III, The Federal
Trade Commission and the Federal Trade Commission Act, in ANTITRUST ADVISOR 340, 345
(1985)). Courts have been reversing important FTC findings and have resorted to a more
restrictive reading of the FTC's authority under Section 5. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Official Airline Guides v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1980); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). This curtailment of the
FTC's Section 5 authority is inconsistent with pre-1980s case law and Congress's goals in
creating the FTC. See Leibling, supra, at 309 (citing Hobbs, supra, at 346-53). "If courts
continue to disregard the broad level of discretion that Congress vested in the F.T.C., they will
effectively strip the F.T.C. of most of its administrative powers and reduce the agency to little
more than an investigative tool .... " Id. at 284.
23 See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
24 It would seem that prior consent judgments "should be influential in subsequent litiga-
tion involving the same industry." EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §40.8, at 122
(1984) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable), 1967 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,980, at 83,472 (N.D.N.Y. 1966)). However, "the circumstances surrounding such negoti-
ated agreements are so different that they cannot be persuasively cited in a litigation context."
Id.
25 See Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 117-20 (breaking the traditional period into 1920
to 1965 and 1965 to 1980 periods). In the traditional period nine 'No-Nos' were established as
per se unlawful regarding patents and antitrust laws: tying, grantbacks, exclusive dealing, ex-
clusive patent grants, package licenses, end-product royalties, restricting sales of products pro-
duced under a process patent license, and minimum prices for licensed products. See Charles
F. Rule, Patent-Antitrust Policy: Looking Back and Ahead, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 729 (1991). All
nine "no-nos" had more or less disappeared by the end of the Reagan Administration. See id.
This was largely due to the fact that, during the 1970s, courts began to challenge aggressive
antitrust enforcement as a result of the influence of "Chicago school" antitrust thinking. See,
e.g., WARD BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 254-55 (1973). In fact, "[by] the time
Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, the Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence of the 1960s
was widely considered to be intellectually bankrupt." Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Anti-
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viewed with skepticism during the traditional period. They were consid-
ered potentially dangerous monopolies to be narrowly construed.26 The
modem approach, however, is to view patents as property rights which
must be preserved because they are essential to an efficient free market
economy.27 This approach, which is more protective of patent owners, is
even more frequently advanced as a result of the formation of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the early 1980s.28 Throughout the
1980s, the non-enforcement policies of the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions severely muted the effect of the antitrust laws.29 There is "little
doubt [, therefore,] that patent abuse [, including patent fraud,] remains a
serious antitrust concern, and [that there continues to be a] need for judi-
cious application of antitrust law in the patent area.' '30
trust: What Fairness Means and Why It Matters, 77 MARQ. L. Rnv. 265, 271 (citing Interview
with William E. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, 52 ANrRUST L.. 23,
42 (1983)).
26 "The patent monopoly granted by Congress was not to be treated as a carte blanche to
impose contractual terms which happened to be privately profitable to the patent holder."
Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 124-25. See also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320
U.S. 661, 665 (1944) (The limits of a patent grant should be "narrowly and strictly confined"
in order to avoid the "evils of expansion" of the patent monopoly through private contracts.)
27 See Baker & Sayler, supra note 2; see also Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights The-
ory and Patent Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 977, 980
(1977) ("[The features of patent rights as property] and the problems they engender indicate
that application of a property rights theory to the patent area does not support a policy of
unrestrained exploitation. Rather, such an application suggests that... restrictions on the
patentee's monopoly power, like compulsory licensing, would be consistent with the character
of patents as property.").
28 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") has maintained a decidedly
pro-patent stance. The CAFC was created in 1982 because it was thought that one court with
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals would promote a consistent interpretation of the law.
See Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A Practitioner's
Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. Rav. 385, 387-88 (1984). The variations in the interpretation of
patent law prior to 1982 had led to forum shopping, discouraged innovation, and made busi-
ness planning difficult. See id. at 387. The CAFC, however, has proven itself to be pro-patent.
From 1982 through 1987 the CAFC upheld 89 percent of the district court decisions finding a
patent valid and reversed 45 percent of the decisions rejecting a patent. See Alexander E.
Silverman, Comment, Intellectual Property Law and the Venture Capital Process, 5 HIGH
T H. L.J. 157, 161-62 (1990). Pre-CAFC courts upheld only 30 to 40 percent of the deci-
sions holding patents valid. See id. at 162. In addition, the CAFC recognizes as binding
precedent the decisions of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
two pro-patent courts. See id; see also, Hughes, supra note 25. Unfortunately, "the uniformity
that the creators of the CAFC originally sought actually transformed the strongest protective
aspects of the patent system into weapons for offensive use against legitimate corporate com-
petition." Michael Paul Chu, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of Predatory Patent In-
fringement, 33 WM. & MARy L. Rav. 1341, 1351-52 (1992).
29 "'In many respects, the past twelve years have been the worst of times for American
antitrust laws."' Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 109 (quoting E. Fox & R. PrroFsKy, AN-n-
TRUST POLICY, CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR THE NEW AD INISTRATION (1993)).
30 Kevin J. Arquit, Patent Abuse and the Antitrust Laws, 59 ANTrrrRUST L.J. 739, 739
(1991).
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There had been some signs that the present administration might
initiate yet another reversal in the direction of national antitrust policy;
early commentators noted their anticipation of a more active future en-
forcement policy in the current Justice Department, particularly in the
area of fraudulent procurement of patents.3 1 A recent head of the Anti-
trust Division seemed to be inclined toward this kind of activism. 32
With the hope that renewed focus on this critical problem might
follow, this article reviews the historic interface between patent and anti-
trust law in Parts I and II, the contexts in which fraudulently procured
patents have become an antitrust problem in Part II, and the evolution of
antitrust remedies seeking to impose limits on the enforcement of patents
procured through fraud or inequities in the Patent Office in Part IV. In
Part V, royalty-free licensing is contrasted with compulsory patent li-
censing for royalties, divestiture, and dedication in terms of the utility
and standards for imposition of such remedies. Finally, in Part VI, the
public policies served by royalty-free licensing for patent fraud and the
circumstances under which this uniquely valuable remedy serves those
policies through consent decrees or when imposed in antitrust litigation
are identified.
The conclusions that seem to follow are: (1) that a means must be
found to increase judicial receptivity to patent-antitrust claims, because
patents are increasingly more likely to be fraudulently procured, often in
violation of the antitrust laws;33 and (2) that compulsory royalty-free pat-
31 See Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 110-11. But see Stephen P. Reynolds, Antitrust
and Patent Licensing: Cycles of Enforcement and Current Policy, JuRnvmrRics, Winter 1997,
at 129, 146:
The scarcity of Supreme Court decisions on the antitrust implications of technology
licensing during the past 20 years makes for uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Clinton
Administration's words and actions suggest that Department of Justice views on the
substantive law are much closer to those of the Bush and Reagan years than to the
aggressive positions taken by earlier generations.
This may be the result of the fact that major changes in DOJ policy may be unlikely. Antitrust
budgets are likely to decline; U.S. intellectual property continues to be an important source of
foreign exchange earnings; and technical innovations are important sources of competitive
advantage for the types of industries the Clinton administration has supported. See Baker &
Sayler, supra note 2, at 110.
32 The Perils of a Pushy Antitrust Policy, Can. TRm., Sept. 13, 1993, at 14N ("President
Clinton's chief trustbuster has served notice that she's ending the laissez faire antitrust policy
of the Reagan and Bush years.").
33 Fraudulently procuring a patent is not a per se antitrust violation; specific intent is also
needed for an attempt to monopolize charge. See Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co.,
819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725
F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); HARMON, supra note 5, § 11.3,
at 460-61:
Under Walker Process the maintenance and enforcement of a patent procured
by knowing and willful fraud may meet the intent and conduct elements of violation
of the Sherman Act, provided that the ability to lessen or destroy competition, in-
cluding market power in the relevant market, can also be shown.
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ent licensing is an important, relatively effective, yet under-utilized
means of protecting the public and the free market, especially given the
decreasing government resources available to counter abuses of the pat-
ent system. Many of the public interests protected by antitrust enforce-
ment would be much better served if a greater number of Walker Process
claims were to be sustained and if compulsory royalty-free licensing
were more widely accepted and imposed.
I. PATENTS AND THE LIMITS OF ENFORCEMENT
Holders of valid letters-patents enjoy.., the exclu-
sive'right and liberty of making and using the invention
therein secured, and of vending the same to others to be
used . . . ; and the rule of law is well settled, that an
invention so secured is property in the holder of the pat-
ent, and that as such the right of the holder is as much
entitled to protection as any other property, during the
term for which the franchise or the exclusive right or
privilege is granted. 34
Patents allow for the exclusive use of inventions for a time, but they
are not granted solely to facilitate the accumulation of private profit. The
primary objective of patent grants is that the public can benefit from
invention.35 This is difficult to achieve, however, where there are finan-
cial incentives to obtain patents by any means, including fraud (or what
is now characterized as "inequitable conduct") 36 before the Patent Office,
and patent applications may not actually represent genuine invention or
A bare allegation that a patentee obtained a patent through inequitable
conduct does not establish a violation of the Sherman Act.
See also Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1993) (reiterating in dicta that,
as in Walker Process, antitrust plaintiffs claiming patent abuses must still allege and prove a
relevant market, and that one cannot presume that a patent itself defines a relevant market);
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
34 Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 226 (1876) (patent infringement suit involving an
improvement patent for a portable and adjustable still-water dam).
35 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11
(1917). "While one great object [of our patent laws] was, by holding out a reasonable reward
to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited period, to
stimulate the effects of genius; the main object was to promote the progress of science and
useful arts." Id. (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1 (1829)). Patent rights also serve the
public interest by encouraging investment-based risks, new jobs, new industries, new con-
sumer goods, and trade benefits. See HARMON, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 8 (citing Loctite Corp.
v. Vetrascal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) ("It is the public interest which is dominant in the
patent system.").
36 See infra note 63 for a description of that which constitutes inequitable conduct.
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advancement of "science and the useful arts."'37 Such incentives clearly
exist where "[b]usiness-growing bigger and bigger each decade-[can]
fasten its hold more tightly on the economy through the cheap spawning
of patents and [use] one monopoly to beget another through the leverage
of key patents. '38
Consequently, because of the potentially enormous destructive eco-
nomic impact of such anticompetitive behavior, courts enforce the princi-
ple that any attempt to enlarge the monopolized domain beyond the
narrow patent claim will deprive a patentee of all rights to enforce its
franchise until the consequences of any illegal extension are fully dissi-
pated.39 Thus, courts of equity will withhold assistance in infringement
suits or suits for royalties until it can be shown that improper anticompe-
titive practices have been abandoned.40 Such practices may also include
37 Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 511 (the proper goal of patents is to "'pro-
mote the progess of science and useful arts.' ") (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8); see also infra
note 311.
38 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 837 (1950)
(Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting) (citing Justices Brandeis and Stone). Justice Douglas
highlighted the problem of tying the licensing of patented articles to the condition that other
unpatented articles be purchased, a practice which effectively enlarges the protections of the
patent system beyond its intended purpose. See id.
39 In Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), the Supreme Court overruled
Henry v. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. 1 (1912) and created the "patent misuse" doctrine. Patent "mis-
use" encompasses patentees utilizing valid patents beyond the scope of their claims. See J.
Thomas McCarthy, A Patent Licensing Policy for Minimizing Antitrust and Misuse Risks, 46 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 547, 574 (1964). The "patent misuse" doctrine was created to deny relief for
patent infringement to a patentee "if he has attempted illegally to extend the scope of his patent
monopoly." Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980); see also
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1942) (holding that efforts to control
prices of a patented article after the patentee's first vending of the patented article were an
inappropriate extension of the patent monopoly). Examples of patent misuse also include ty-
ing arrangements, conditional licensing agreements, patent pooling, and some cross licensing
arrangements. See John M. Bloxom IV, Comment, On the Convergence of the Patent and
Antitrust Statutes: SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 39 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 245, 256 (1982). The
defense of patent misuse renders the patent unenforceable regardless of the validity of the
patent. See Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust
Violation, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488
(1942)). The infringer need not even prove that it in fact was harmed. See Morton Salt, 314
U.S. at 493-94.
40 The "patent misuse" doctrine remains in effect until the misuse is discontinued and the
effects are dissipated. Byron A. Bilicki, Standard Antitrust Analysis and the Doctrine of Pat-
ent Misuse: A Unification Under the Rule of Reason, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 209, 214 (1984). In
some instances, this unenforceability may provide a windfall for a wrongdoer (the infringer).
See Robert J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse, 53 AN=rrRUST L.J. 641, 647 (1985) (suggesting that in
order to avoid the harshness of the patent misuse doctrine the courts should hold the misusing
clause unenforceable rather than the entire patent); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economic
Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1619 (1990) (arguing that
the effect of the "patent misuse doctrine is to unfairly create a scheme of compulsory royalty
free licensing where a patentee is guilty of misuse and an unharmed infringer is unnecessarily
rewarded). Legislation and cases limited the patent misuse doctrine during the 1980s. See
generally Hoerner, supra; J. Diane Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RurERS
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fraud or inequitable conduct before the Patent Office,41 offenses which
are of greater consequence because they call into question the legitimacy
of the patent itself, regardless of whether the patent can be shown to be
part of a scheme to violate the patent or antitrust laws.
A. PATENT FRAu
Ordinarily, a patent issued by the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office is presumed valid.42 That presumption, however, is not con-
clusive.43 Where a patent is obtained by fraud, the Attorney General
may file suit for cancellation, 4 which is a request for revocation of the
COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 357 (1990); L. Peter Faskes, Can a Patent Still be Misused?, Airm-
TRUST L.J. 677 (1991); Robert J. Hoemer, Patent Misuse: Portents for the 1990s, 59 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 687 (1991). The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, for example, limited patent
misuse defenses, specifically in tying arrangements. See Lemley, supra, at 1624. Tying ar-
rangements exist when the patent licensor conditions the grant of the license on the licensee
purchasing property which is not the subject of the patent nor covered by its claims.
See Thomas V. Heyman, Patent Licensing and the Antitrust Laws -A Reappraisal at the Close
of the Decade, 14 ANrnTRUST BuLrN' 537, 540 (1969); Comment, Coercive Patent Packag-
ing - The Need for a Rule of Reason, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 748, 754-55 (1973) (discussing
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967) (where the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the coerced patent packaging, analyzed as a standard tying arrangement,
was a misuse per se)); see also Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)
(patentee Was denied patent protection for infringement of salt dispensing equipment because
of its practice of licensing the use of the equipment on the purchase of salt exclusively from
the patentee). "The patentee, like... other holders of an exclusive privilege granted in the
furtherance of a public policy, may not claim protection of his grant by the courts where it is
being used to subvert that policy." Id. at 494. The statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), now reads:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory in-
fringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the follow-
ing: ... (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisi-
tion of a license to rights in another patent or purchase'of a separate product, unless,
in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
The "market power" requirement now institutes an intermediate standard between the previous
per se rule and the proposed Senate requirement of an antitrust violation. See, e.g., Kenneth J.
Burchfield, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be the Tie? " 4 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
1, 26 (1991).
41 See infra notes 52, 64-65. Inequitable conduct is a defense under section 282 of the
Patent Code, rendering all claims unenforceable. See J.P. Stevens v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d
1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
42 See infra note 64.
43 Since the adoption of the first patent act in 1790, Congress and the courts have con-
sistently permitted judicial review of patents originally obtained in ex parte proceedings in the
PTO. HARMON, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 9; see also E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley &
Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The presumption is not conclusive and can be
rebutted by proof the PTO erred"); Floridin Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 35 F. Supp. 810, 814
(D. Del. 1940), aff'd, 125 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1942).
44 There are two stages at which fraudulent patent claims may be attacked. One is be-
tween the filing of the application and the issuance of the patent, accomplished through inter-
ferences. The second is during the life of the issued patent. Federal district courts do not have
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patent by virtue of the general equity powers of the judiciary.4 5 Suits for
cancellation became viable after 1888, when the United States was al-
lowed-to sue the American Bell Telephone Company alleging that the
patent for Alexander Graham Bell's telephone had been fraudulently ob-
tained.46 The government claimed Bell had actually acquired the ideas
of a competitor.47 In addressing the standing of the United States to sue,
the Supreme Court concluded that nothing prohibited the government
from moving to cancel wrongfully procured patents, that no inference to
that effect could be drawn from the fact that accused infringers may also
raise the defense of invalidity.48 Subsequent decisions, of course, have
emphasized the need for proof of fraud or misrepresentation in suits for
cancellation since the Court will not entertain mere challenges to the dis-
cretionary decisions of the Patent Office.49 Nevertheless, if the PTO has
been induced to allow a new patent over a prior patent by intentional
misrepresentation, the government may sue to cancel 5° even though a
original jurisdiction to conduct interferences; these procedures are initially conducted in the
Patent Office. Consolidated World Housewares, Inc. v. Finlde, 831 F.2d 261, 265 (Fed. Cir.
1987); see also General Instrument, Corp. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 995 F.2d 209 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (discussing patent office interference proceedings). If an interference is not charged, the
Commissioner of Patents is the one who must challenge pending applications. See Peter D.
Rosenberg, The Assertion of a Fraud Upon The Patent Office as a Means of Defeating the
Patent Monopoly, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 455, 460-61 (1968). Subsequent to the issuance of a
patent, the Attorney General must take the initiative.
45 See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
There is nothing in these provisions expressing an intention of limiting the power of
the government of the United States to get rid of a patent obtained from it by fraud
and deceit. And although the legislature may have given to private individuals a
more limited form of relief ... we think the argument that this was intended to
supersede the affirmative relief to which the United States is entitled, to obtain a
cancellation or vacation of an instrument obtained from it by fraud.., is not sound.
Id. at 373; see also United States v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 431 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1970) (patent
fraud invoked as the basis for cancellation of an issued patent); Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S.
434 (1871) (there is no right in a private party to cancel a patent on the ground of fraudulent
obtainment).
46 See American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315.
47 See id. at 353.
48 See id. at 373.
[Tihe suit of the government, if successful, declares the patent void, sets it aside as
of no force, vacates it or recalls it, and puts an end to all suits which the patentee can
bring against anybody. It opens to the entire world the use of the invention or dis-
covery in regard to which the patentee had asserted a monopoly.
Id. at 372.
49 See e.g. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897). Least of all
was it intended to be affirmed that the courts of the United States, sitting as courts of equity,
could entertain jurisdiction of a suit by the United States to set aside a patent for an invention
on the mere ground of error of judgment on the part of the patent officials. Id. at 269.
50 "[Patent] applications [have] been set aside by the government based upon fraudulent
statements or exhibits, even where the applicant may have otherwise been entitled to the pat-
ent." 7 voN KALrnowsKi, supra note 5, §59.05(2)(a)(ii), at 59-55 (citing, inter alia, Ex parte
Mallard, 71 U.S.P.Q. 294 (1946)). Some critics, however, have emphatically argued that
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defense of invalidity may also be available in a private infringement
suit.51
Actually, accused infringers have not always been allowed to assert
this defense of invalidity. In fact, soon after the Civil War, in Rubber
Co. v. Goodyear,52 the Supreme Court held that courts could not review
errors not obvious on the face of a patent.5 3 That view was subsequently
abandoned,54 however, and defendants were eventually allowed to assert
invalidity by reason of materially false statements5 5 made in obtaining
the patent or a related patent.56 Then, toward the end of World War 1I, in
courts should not be invalidating patents issued by the United States Patent Office at all. See
Howard I. Forman, Patent/Antitrust Ecology v. National Prosperity, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 86
(1973) (promoting a 'utilization theory' of patents and suggesting that the solution to the waste
created by courts invalidating patents, without regard to national prosperity, is to have an
incontestible period which a patentee may elect after five years in exchange for a shortening of
the viable period of the patent).
51 See Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (a patent procured by fraud
or inequitable conduct is unenforceable). The violation of the duty to disclose material infor-
mation to the Patent Office when applying for a patent, however, also constitutes inequitable
conduct and renders even a patent which is otherwise valid unenforceable. See Brunswick
Corp. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 532, 592 (1995). The standard for materiality is whether a
reasonable patent examiner would have considered the withheld information important in de-
ciding whether to issue the patent. See Brunswick Corp., 34 Fed. Cl. at 592-93. However, the
materiality of the omitted information alone does not determine a breach of this duty of can-
dor. A finding of intent to violate the duty of candor, which is also required, will not be
inferred merely from a finding of materiality. See Schlering Corp. v. Optical Radiation Corp.,
867 F.2d 616, 618 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 813 (1989). The two elements of inequi-
table conduct, materiality and intent, are considered on a sliding scale such that a strong show-
ing of either may compensate for a mere threshold showing of the other. See Brunswick Corp.,
34 Fed. Cl. at 592. Proof of fraud or inequitable conduct must be clear and convincing, but
will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See id. But see Coming Glass Works
v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966) (suggesting the remedy of
patent unenforceability for inequitable conduct such as intentional misrepresentations, even if
immaterial).
52 76 U.S. 788 (1869).
53 Id. at 797.
54 See Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354 (1884) (a court has a right and a duty to declare a
patent reissue pro tanto void where commissioner has exceeded his power).
55 See Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358 (1928) (mere mis-
statements to the Patent Office were held not material and did not destroy the presumption of
validity).
56 Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933). In affirming that
all five patents-in-suit were unenforceable due to unclean hands, the Supreme Court stated that
"courts of equity do not make quality of suitors the test. They apply the maxim requiring clean
hands only where some unconscionable act of one coming for relief has immediate and neces-
sary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of the matter in litigation." Id. at 245.
Likewise, in Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806 (1945), the Court held the three Automotive patents-in-suit unenforceable for unclean
hands. See id. at 819. After discovering that Precision Instrument's asserted inventor filed
false dates of invention, Automotive settled an interference without notifying the Patent Office
of the inequitable conduct. See id. at 818-19. The settlement agreement acknowledged the
validity of the claims and required that all rights in the patents be assigned to Automotive. See
id. at 819. The suit before the Court was brought to enforce the agreements and the patents.
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Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,57 the Court finally held
that the total effect of a patent fraudulently procured and wrongfully en-
forced should result in a complete denial of relief for the claimed in-
fringement.5 8 "The public welfare demands that the agencies of public
justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless
victims of deception and fraud."' 59 A year later, in Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co.,60 the Court explained
that: "[t]he far reaching social and economic consequences of a patent
give the public a paramount interest in seeing that the patent monopolies
do not spring from fraud or other inequitable conduct .... ,61
As a result of these decisions, the doctrine of "unclean hands" is
now invoked to prevent wrongdoers during the patent procurement pro-
cess from enjoying the fruits of such transgressions and to prevent injury
to the public. 62 Today, proof of deliberate misrepresentation with almost
any degree of certainty will allow the successful assertion of this doctrine
by defendants in infringement suits.63
See id. at 806. The Court stated that "[tihe history of the patents and contracts in issue is
steeped in perjury and undisclosed knowledge of perjury." Id. at 816. The Court followed
Keystone Driller and determined that Automotive's inequitable conduct was in not disclosing
to the PTO that the false affidavit affected the entire cause of action and justified dismissal
under the unclean hands doctrine. See id. at 814-15, 819.
57 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
58 Id. at 250. The patent in Hazel-Atlas was obtained by practicing fraud on the Patent
Office. To overcome cited prior art, "experts" were enlisted by Hartford and their lawyers to
publish an article stating that the invention was a remarkable advance in the art. See id. at 240.
This publication was later offered to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse a decision in
an infringement action. See id. at 241. Nine years later, after discovering the fraud, the Court
of Appeals denied the infringer's petition for a review on the grounds that the fraud was not
newly discovered; it was not the primary basis of its earlier decision; and the court did not
have the capacity to set aside the decision. See id. at 243-44. The Supreme Court reversed the
Third Circuit and ordered it to direct the trial court to set aside the judgment. See id. at 251.
The Court stated that fraud, especially in a patent case, is a matter of public concern, with
effects extending beyond the parties to the litigation. See id. at 246; see also Molins PLC v.
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178-82 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (denying enforcement of a patent in an
infringement action because a failure to disclose a prior art reference known to applicant's
patent agent and cited by foreign patent officials in denying foreign applications was a material
non-disclosure with a specific intent and thus constituted inequitable conduct); Pollenex Corp.
v. Sunbeam-Home Comfort 835 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. fl1. 1993) (patent held unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct during patent application process which involved a material concealing
of prior art used in conception and development of a patented product which a reasonable
examiner would have thought important to the decision to issue the patent).
59 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246.
60 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
61 Id. at 816.
62 See id. at 815. In Hazel-Atlas, a plaintiff procured a settlement of an interference suit,
acquiesced in obscuring relevant data in the Patent Office, obtained the patent, and then barred
other parties from questioning its validity. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 251. The patent was held
unenforceable. See id.
63 The concept of inequitable conduct in patent procurement derives from the equi-
table doctrine of unclean hands: that a person who obtains a patent by intentionally
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B. THE INFRINGERS' DEFENSE OF INVALIDITY
In addition to the judicially created defense of "inequitable conduct"
before the Patent Office, which renders the patent unenforceable, infring-
ers also have a statutory right to assert the invalidity of the patent which
is the predicate of the infringement action. 64 This defense may be based
misleading the PTO can not enforce the patent. Inequitable conduct may be held
although the common law elements of fraud are absent. To achieve a just applica-
tion of this penalty in the variety of situations that may arise, this court established a
balancing test in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984), whereby the materiality of the infor-
mation that was not provided to the PTO is weighed against the intent of the actor.
The court is charged with reaching an equitable result in view of the particular cir-
cumstances of the case.
Demaco Corp. v. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1988). To
establish inequitable conduct, however, an intent to deceive is required. See RCA Corp. v.
Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989). A finding of intent to deceive may
follow from an assessment of materiality, knowledge, and surrounding circumstances, includ-
ing evidence of good faith. However, a declaration of lack of intent to deceive the PTO is not
sufficient to preclude a summary judgment on the issue of inequitable conduct. See Paragon
Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1993). "Conduct before the
PTO that may render a patent unenforceable is broader than 'common law fraud."' Kings-
down Med. Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1067 (1989); see also Pro-Mold and Tool Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.2d
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Preservation Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). Such conduct may include "failure to disclose material information, or submission
of false material information, with an intent to mislead." See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex
Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (inequitable conduct is a defense under section
282 of the Patent Code rendering all claims unenforceable), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985);
see also Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied 474 U.S. 903 (1985) (patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct); Refac
Int'l v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 887 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (patentee's submission of affida-
vits to Patent Office during application process in which affiants attested to their belief that
disclosure in patent application could teach them to make subject invention, while omitting
information regarding affiant's prior employment by patentee as well as their contact with and
knowledge of invention process, was inequitable conduct that rendered patent invalid). How-
ever, "'inequitable conduct' requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of a threshold
degree of materiality of the nondisclosed or false information... [and it] requires proof of...
intent [even though] that intent need not be proven with direct evidence." J.P. Stevens, 747
F.2d at 1559-60. As stated in Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 933,
943 (S.D.N.Y. 1982):
The gravamen of the fraud defense is that the patentee has failed to discharge his
duty of dealing with the examiner in a manner free from the taint of "fraud or other
inequitable conduct." If such conduct is established in connection with the prosecu-
tion of a patent, the fact that the lack of candor did not directly affect all the claims
in the patent has never been the governing principle. It is the inequitable conduct
that generates the unenforceability of the patent.
64 A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in independ-
ent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently
of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be
presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of estab-
lishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting
such invalidity.
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringe-
ment of a patent and shall be pleaded:
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on either a mistake as to patentability or the willful, fraudulent procure-
ment of a patent for an unpatentable discovery or invention.65
A finding of non-infringement at the conclusion of plaintiff's case,
however, leaves unchallenged the presumption of patent validity, and
thereby allows a plaintiff who might be the owner of an invalid patent to
continue to assert, unchallenged, questionable rights against both com-
petitors and the public. Public policy and judicial economy would seem
better served, therefore, if patent validity were addressed prior to the
issue of infringement. 66
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability,
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II of
this title as a condition for patentability,
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any re-
quirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title,
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.
In actions involving the validity or infringement of a patent the party asserting
invalidity or noninfringement shall give notice in the pleadings or otherwise in writ-
ing to the adverse party at least thirty days before the trial, of the country, number,
date, and name of the patentee of any patent, the title, date, and page numbers of any
publication to be relied upon as anticipation of the patent in suit or, except in actions
in the United States Claims Court [United States Court of Federal Claims], as show-
ing the state of the art, and the name and address of any person who may be relied
upon as the prior inventor or as having prior knowledge of or as having previously
used or offered for sale the invention of the patent in suit. In the absence of such
notice proof of the said matters may not be made at the trial except on such terms as
the court requires.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1981 & Supp. 1997).
65 See id.
66 This is not dissimilar from the public policy that impelled the Court in Blonder-
Tongue Lab. Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1970), to overrule its earlier
decision in Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), which held that a judgment of invalidity
was not res judicata against the patentee in subsequent litigation against a different defendant:
To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without
contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the
same claim in the prior suit, the defendant's time and money are diverted from alter-
native uses-productive or otherwise-to relitigation of a decided issue. And, still
assuming that the issue was resolved correctly in the first suit, there is reason to be
concerned about the plaintiff's allocation of resources. Permitting repeated litigation
of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects
either the aura of the gaming table or a "lack of discipline and of disinterestedness
on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of
procedure.
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329. Blonder-Tongue states that a patent owner is collaterally
estopped by a prior judgment of invalidity unless it did not have "a fair opportunity procedur-
ally, substantively and evidently to pursue his claim the first time." Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S.
at 333 (citing Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (Mass. 1960)). Future
competitors, therefore, are protected against being compelled to mount perpetual validity chal-
lenges, and judicial economy as well as public policy are served by findings of invalidity
before any additional defendants are forced to defend what might often be anticompetitive
infringement litigation.
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The Supreme Court addressed this problem, essentially one of jus-
ticiability, in three early decisions. 67 In 1939, in Electrical Fittings
Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co.,6 8 the Court held that a non-infringing de-
fendant could not compel an appellate court to review a finding of valid-
ity but could demand that the finding be vacated.69 The Court reasoned
that because invalidity had been raised as an affirmative defense rather
than a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment, a ruling on validity
would be unnecessary. 70 However, a few years later, in an infringement
suit which did involve a counterclaim of invalidity seeking a declaratory
judgment,71 the Court stated:
To hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a
hypothetical case. But the situation in the present case is
quite different. We have here not only bill and answer
but a counterclaim. Though the decision of non-in-
fringement disposes of the bill and answer, it does not
dispose of the counterclaim which raises the question of
validity .... [T]he issue of validity may be raised by a
counterclaim in an infringement suit.... [W]e are of the
view that the issues raised by the present counterclaim
were justiciable and that the controversy between the
parties did not come to an end on the dismissal of the bill
for non-infringement, since their dispute went beyond
the single claim and the particular accused devices in-
volved in that suit.72
67 Compare Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943), and Electrical Fittings Corp. v.
Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939), with Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp.,
325 U.S. 327 (1945).
68 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
69 A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in his favor, for the purpose
of obtaining a review of findings he deems erroneous which are not necessary to
support the decree. But here the decree itself purports to adjudge the validity of
claim 1, and though the adjudication was immaterial to the disposition of the cause,
it stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated. We think the petitioners
were entitled to have this portion of the decree eliminated ....
Id. at 242.
70 See id. In Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980),
[t]he Court noted that the petitioners in Electrical Fittings retained a stake in the
outcome of the case on appeal, despite a judgment of non-infringement in their favor
at trial, because the presence of the patent invalidity issue kept the case alive,
thereby avoiding dismissal under Article III. In a footnote, however, the Court
stated that although the district court was correct in inquiring fully into the validity
of the patent, the court erred in adjudging the patent valid after ruling that there had
been no infringement, and that by doing so, the district court had decided a hypothet-
ical controversy.
Ku & LaFuze, supra note 6, at 548-49 (citing Deposit Guaranty, 445 U.S. at 335-36 n.7).
71 See Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943).
72 Id. at 363-64 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). But see Ku & LaFuze, supra note
6, at 547 ("Given the availability of the Declaratory Judgment Act... it appears that basing
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In emphasizing the ongoing nature of the parties' dispute in Altvater, and
by suggesting that such counterclaims ought to be resolved, the Altvater
decision could be read to require that a counterclaim ought to be dis-
missed (or a judgment of invalidity vacated) unless the parties' dispute
extends beyond the instant claim of infringement. 73
Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp.74 presented an oppor-
tunity to clarify Electrical Fittings and Altvater. Sinclair concluded that,
"of the two questions, [validity and infringement,] validity has the
greater public importance, and [thus] the District Court [follows] what
will usually be the better practice by inquiring fully into the validity of
[the] patent [even in a case involving non-infringement]." 75 However,
because the Court left unanswered the question of whether a court was
required to rule on validity in the absence of infringement, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), since its inception,
has routinely vacated declaratory judgments regarding patent validity fol-
lowing determinations of non-infringement. 76
In 1993, the Supreme Court addressed this practice in Cardinal
Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'l Inc.77 Maneuvering around its prior deci-
sions, the Court noted that Electrical Fittings, unlike Altvater, did not
involve a declaratory judgment, but Altvater did not necessarily answer
the question of whether validity would be moot in the absence of an
ongoing or continuing infringement dispute. 78 The Federal Circuit's
practice of vacating judgments of invalidity on findings of non-infringe-
ment was therefore held consistent with prior precedent. However, the
the [Altvater] decision on the presence of additional claims in the counterclaim was both un-
necessary and confusing.") (footnote omitted).
73 See, e.g., Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 1518-21 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (the contro-
versy did not extend beyond the non-infringing actions and the court could exercise its discre-
tion to dismiss a validity appeal); Fonor Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Corp., 821 F.2d 627, 634
& n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988) (stating that a finding of non-
infringement eliminated the case or controversy and the defendant's counterclaim merely re-
peated the affirmative defenses).
74 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
75 Id. at 330 (citation omitted).
76 Vieau, 823 F.2d 1510, and Fonar, 821 F.2d 627, are the "two cases that gave birth to
the Federal Circuit's practice of routinely vacating judgments of invalidity after determining
that the patent at issue was not infringed." Ku & LaFuze, supra note 6, at 549. However,
the Federal Circuit's practice injures not only the alleged infringer, and the public; it
also may unfairly deprive the patentee itself of the appellate review that is a compo-
nent of the one full and fair opportunity to have the validity issue adjudicated cor-
rectly. If, following a finding of noninfringement, a declaratory judgment on
validity is routinely vacated .... the patentee may have lost the practical value of a
patent that should be enforceable against different infringing devices.
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1993); see also Ku & LaFuze,
supra note 6, at 553-54, 560 (setting out public policy reasons for ruling on patent validity
notwithstanding a finding of noninfringement).
77 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
78 See id. at 95.
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Supreme Court also held that in light of important policy considera-
tions,79 a finding of non-infringement alone is not a sufficient basis per
se for vacating a judgment of patent invalidity.80
Cardinal Chemical, by narrowing a trial court's ability to circum-
vent the issue of patent validity on a finding of non-infringement, pro-
vides additional support for the public interest in protecting the integrity
of the patent system. More concretely, the decision makes infringement
litigation more risky for patentees with reason to believe their patents are
vulnerable. Cardinal Chemical, however, does very little to enhance the
effectiveness of present remedies for fraudulently obtained patents.
C. Tim LICENSEES' DEFENSE OF INVALiDiTY
Traditionally, licensees were estopped to deny the validity of pat-
ents used under license.8 1 Therefore, even though invalidity might have
been established, a patent could still be used to oppress those who,
though aware of its questionable character, entered into license agree-
ments to avoid the expense and trouble of mounting an attack against
it.82 It had long been argued, however, that "the public cannot justly
refuse to withdraw the appearance of authority, under which such a
wrong is perpetrated .... -83 "It must be as much the duty of the court in
a patent case to protect the public against having to pay tribute to a pat-
entee who is not in any true sense an inventor ... as to protect the patent
rights of... a real inventor." 84
Consequently, in 1942, in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric
Co., 85 the Supreme Court held that a licensee would no longer be es-
79 We also emphasized the importance to the public atlarge of resolving questions
of patent validity[,] ... the wasteful consequences of relitigating the validity of a
patent after it has once been held invalid in a fair trial, and ... the danger that the
opportunity to relitigate might, as a practical matter, grant monopoly privileges to
the holders of invalid patents.... [T]he Federal Circuit's practice of routinely vacat-
ing judgments of validity after finding noninfringement creates a similar potential
for relitigation and imposes ongoing burdens on competitors who are convinced that
a patent has been correctly found invalid.
Id. at 100-01 (citations omitted).
80 See id. at 102.
81 See Jefferson Electric Co. v. Sola Electric Co., 125 F.2d 322, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1941)
(the estoppel of a licensee to deny the validity of the licensed patent is elemental and a depar-
ture from this principle should be addressed to Congress, not the courts).
82 See 2 WmLiAm C. ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS § 728, at 478 (Boston, Little, Brown,
and Co. 1890).
83 Id.
84 Frank Adam Electric Co. .v. Colt Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co., 148 F.2d 497, 502-03
(8th Cir. 1945) (holding that the district court's conclusion of both validity and infringement
were not justified by the evidence).
85 317 U.S. 173 (1942). This was an action for unpaid royalties and an injunction re-
straining further sales except in conformity with a license agreement containing a price-fixing
clause. See id. The licensee's counterclaim asserted both the illegality of the price fixing
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topped from challenging the license by showing patent invalidity,86 and
that a violation of the Sherman Act would deprive a patentee of protec-
tion from patent rules of estoppel.87 Then, a generation later, Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins 88 overruled the Supreme Court's prior holding in Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc.,89 that licensee estoppel
should be "the general rule", and pointed out that:
Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an
inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled, the public
may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be
monopolists without need or justification. 90
Both licensees and accused infringers, therefore, are now in a stronger
position to challenge the validity of patents being asserted against them
under the patent law than they were during the early, "traditional" anti-
trust era.91 However, since the incentive to engage in patent fraud to
clause as well as its non-liability for royalties. See id. at 173-74. The licensee then showed
that the patent was invalid and argued that the license, and its set prices, were unlawful and
unenforceable. See id.
86 Id. at 177; see also White & Staubitz, The Antitrust Attack on Patent Licensing - From
Light Bulbs to Lear Jets, 25 Bus. LAW 1725, 1727 (1970).
87 Sola, 317 U.S. at 177; see also White & Staubitz, supra note 86. The greatest amount
of tension between patent law and antitrust law would appear to exist in patent license agree-
ments. See generally Symposium, Patent-Antitrust: Dead or Alive?, 59 ANTrrRUST L.J. 657
(1991) (articles on patent-antitrust tension).
88 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
89 339 U.S. 827 (1950); see supra note 38 and accompanying text, for the dissent's view
of Automatic Radio.
90 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
91 Public policy now favors invalidating worthless patents. See Richard H. Stem, Anti-
trust Implications of Lear v. Adkins, 15 ANTITRUST BuLL. 663, 667 (1970) ("The first and
most obvious implication of Lear v. Adkins... is the proposition that if public policy favors
the invalidation of specious patents, then the government should bring suits to declare such
patents invalid and thus vindicate that public policy."). Consequently, since Lear v. Adkins,
several circuits refused to enforce patent license provisions that permit the licensor to termi-
nate the license after the licensee challenges validity, and placed royalties in escrow during
pendency of patent challenges despite contractual obligations to pay the licensor. See, e.g.,
Precision Shooting Equipment Co. v. Allen, 646 F.2d 313 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
9634 (1981); Atlas Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Moraine Products, 509 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1974).
However, more recently, the Federal Circuit has characterized the reasoning of Lear v. Adkins
as "tones that echo from a past era of scepticism over intellectual property principles," and has
held that there are still circumstances in which the equities of contractual relationships should
deprive one party of the right to challenge validity despite the public policy of encouraging
challenges of potentially invalid patents. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d
1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Cordis Corp v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986) (it would not be fair for licensees to be allowed to cease royalty
payments while continuing to benefit from the licensing agreement); accord Warner Jenkinson
Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 567 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1977); Nebraska Engineering Corp v.
Shivvers, 557 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1977). Potential infringers, after all, should not be "en-
couraged to enter into bad faith negotiations for a license when their clear intention is simply
to challenge the validity of the patent." See Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 250-51; see also
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facilitate monopoly continues to be high,92 the search for effective and
appropriate antitrust remedies remains urgent regardless of whether de-
fenses or counterclaims of invalidity are sustained. In other words, the
fact that the government can move to cancel a fraudulently procured pat-
ent,93 or that fraud may support an invalidity defense for accused infring-
ers, may not fully protect the public.94 The Justice Department rarely
moves to cancel. 95 As mentioned earlier, there is always much economic
incentive for patentees to conspire with infringers and those who might
initiate patent office interferences to conceal invalidity and avoid litiga-
tion through oligarchic cross-licensing, thus disadvantaging the rest of
the market. 96 Left unchallenged, fraudulently obtained patents can con-
tinue to thwart competition. Moreover, even if patent validity were fairly
well policed by the government, cancellation and judgments of unen-
forceability still would not be enough to correct on-going restraints of
trade caused by fraudulent patents, or restore free and competitive mar-
kets.97 The protection of consumers from the inequity and evil of patent
fraud requires strict antitrust enforcement and effective remedies.
II. PATENTS AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
It has not always been clear that courts should have jurisdiction to
destroy or limit patent rights. In fact, prior to the advent of antitrust
Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (a provision of a settlement order
that required a licensee to make payments without regard to any subsequent determination of
validity or enforceability of a patent will preclude licensee from terminating payments after
patent is adjudged unenforceable in a separate action). Recently, a licensee in the United
States was held liable for breach of a patent licensing agreement under a patent declared inva-
lid because it failed to disclose, as required by the agreement, its use of a new process, thus
delaying a timely challenge to the invalid patent. See Studiengeselschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v.
Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
92 See supra notes 3-11, 38 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
94 See E.L duPont de Nemours v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1274 (8th Cir. 1980)
(inequitable conduct short of fraud can be a defense in a patent infringement suit but cannot
support an antitrust claim for damages and other injunctive relief beneficial to the public);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1989); FMC Corp. v.
Manitowoc Co., Inc., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-
Evercoat Co., Inc., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp.,
752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Medical Industries, Inc.,
516 F.2d 514, 521 (5th Cir. 1975).
95 During the years 1790 to 1960, for example, the government brought only nine suits to
cancel patents for fraudulent procurement from the patent office, and most were dismissed
because of lack of proof. See S. William Cochran, Historical Review of Fraud in Patent
Procurement: The Standards and Procedures for Doing Business Before the Patent Office, 52
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 71, 75 (1970).
96 See, e.g., American Cyanamid v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
97 Such orders only remove property rights as compared to the broader remedial orders
possible in antitrust cases. See generally Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§41-58
(1994).
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litigation around the turn of the century, the government had been denied
the right to question a patent's validity when it had attempted to chal-
lenge the judgement of patent examiners in United States v. American
Bell Telephone.98 The Court held that federal courts could not be used to
attack patents collaterally because this would amount to an unauthorized
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Patent Office.99
The antitrust laws, however, "were enacted to prevent competitors from
contracting or combining in such a way as to put artificial handicaps in
the way of [others] who would thus be deprived of the opportunity to
serve the public interest" 00 and to "'secur[e] fair opportunity for the
play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire
for gain.'"'10 1
The Clayton Act' 02 was intended to strike down a monopoly at its
inception, 0 3 when the first steps are taken, while the Sherman Act' °4
seeks to eliminate a monopoly after it has become more viable.10 5 In
addition, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act defines "unfair
methods of competition" to include incipient or actual violations of anti-
trust laws 106 as well as whatever new standards for actionable "non-com-
98 167 U.S. 224 (1897); see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
99 See id. at 269.
100 United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945) (com-
paring the patent laws to the anti-trust laws).
101 FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931) (quoting FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
261 U.S. 463, 476 (1923)). "The paramount aim of the act is the protection of the public from
the evils likely to result from the destruction of competition or the restriction of it in a substan-
tial degree .. ." Id. at 647-48; see also California Rice Indus. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 716, 721 (9th
Cir. 1939).
102 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1992)).
103 "The intent here.., is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and
well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding." S.
Rep. No. 81-1775, at 4 (1950).
104 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1992)).
105 The Sherman Act deals with contracts, agreements and combinations which tend
to the prejudice of the public by the undue restriction of competition or the undue
obstruction of the due course of trade, and which tend to "restrict the common
liberty to engage therein."
The Clayton Act, so far as it deals with the subject, was intended to reach in
their incipiency agreements embraced within the sphere of the Sherman Act.
FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1930) (citations omitted); see also United States v.
Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 308 (E.D. Mich. 1951), affd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
106 See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 691-93 (1948). "[The] legislative his-
tory shows a strong congressional purpose not only to continue enforcement of the Sherman
Act by the Department of Justice ... but also to supplement that enforcement through the
administrative process of the new Trade Commission." Id. at 692. A violation of FTCA sec-
tion 5 is an implicit violation of the antitrust laws. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322
(1966) ("[The Commission has the power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipi-
ency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of... the antitrust laws."). Thus,
any actual antitrust violation is certainly sufficient for the FTC to act under § 5. See FTC v.
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petitive" activity or conditions might develop. 10 7 Section (5)(b) of the
FTCA10 8 provides the Commission With a complete array of essentially
equitable remedies similar to those available to federal courts under the
Sherman Act, including relief designed to correct non-competitive condi-
tions in an industry or market. 10 9 Thus, the antitrust laws protect com-
petitors while maintaining the potential for competition." 0
The wrongful subversion of the patent system to acquire control
over technology important to an industry, on the other hand, inherently
destroys the potential for competition in that industry. More than fifty-
five years ago, in the final report of a national temporary executive com-
mittee set up to study patents,"' it was noted that in:
many important segments of our economy the privilege
accorded by the patent monopoly has been shamefully
abused .. . . It has been used as a device to control
whole industries, to suppress competition, to restrict out-
put, to enhance prices, to suppress inventions, and to dis-
courage inventiveness." 2
Therefore, the public interest in freedom from wrongful economic mo-
nopoly has long required the occasional limitation of the protections af-
forded by patent law." 3
Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953) ("[A] device which has sewed up a
market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and
is therefore an 'unfair method of competition' within the meaning of § 5 ... .
107 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1992).
1O8 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1992)). "The object of the Trade Commission Act was to stop in their incip-
iency those methods of competition which fall within the meaning of the word 'unfair."' Rala-
dam, 283 U.S. at 647.
109 Enforcement of the Sherman Act is solely the responsibility of the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1992). The FTC is entrusted with enforcing
the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1992), and the Department of Justice and the FTC have joint
authority to enforce the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25 (1992). The Court has analogized
the power of the FTC to fashion appropriate relief to that of a court of equity to fashion
Sherman Act decrees. FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1922).
110 The Congressional purpose in enacting the Sherman Act was to insure a competitive
business economy. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 559
(1944). The creation of the FTC and the enactment of the Clayton Act was a twofold response
by Congress to correct the inability of the Sherman Act to handle certain types of anti-compet-
itive practices. See 1 VON KALiNowsI, supra note 5, § 2.03(3), at 2-57.
111 See FnAL REPORT OF THE TNEC, S. Doc. No. 77-35, at 36 (1st Sess. 1941).
112 I/
113 See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
Undoubtedly the patentee has the right to grant the use of the rights or privileges
conferred by his patent to others ... but the right to make regulation in the public
interest under the police power of the States or in the exertion of the authority of
Congress over matters within its constitutional power is controlled by general princi-
ples of law, and the patent right confers no privilege to make contracts in themselves
illegal, and certainly not to make those directly violative of valid statutes of the
1998]
490 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:467
Fortunately, Congress left certain terms found in the FTCA, such as
"unfair method of competition," without precise definition, intending
each case to be determined on its own facts. 114 The phrase generally
applies to practices characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or op-
pression, or those which are contrary to public policy because of their
dangerous tendency to unduly hinder competition or create monopoly.' 15
Remedies for such antitrust violations must (1) put an end to the conspir-
acy, if that itself is the violation; (2) deprive the antitrust defendants of
the benefits of their violations; and (3) render impotent the monopoly
power which violates the antitrust law. 116 Equitable remedies-such as
divestiture, 117 dissolution, 118 or compulsory licensing' 19-must undo
what could have been prevented had the defendants not outdistanced the
government in their unlawful plan.' 20 Remedial orders must take into
United States .... The patent grant does not limit the right of Congress to enact
legislation not interfering with the legitimate rights secured by the patent but prohib-
iting in the public interest the making of agreements which may lessen competition
and build up monopoly.
Id. at 463-64.
114 Congress intended the FTC to have broad power to determine what types of commer-
cial conduct constituted unfair or deceptive practices in the future, as new circumstances arise.
See 51 Cong. Rec. 12871 (1914); see also Casewell 0. Hobbs, IIn, The Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Federal Trade Commission Act, in ANTITRUST ADVISOR 334, § 5.07 at 345
(Carla Anderson Hills ed., McGraw Hill 3d ed. 1985) ("In analyzing a particular business
practice, accordingly, the FTC is not limited to past precedent and may employ a novel legal
theory or an innovative mode of analysis to determine whether a practice is unfair under § 5.").
The FTC has the authority to forbid continuance of an activity which, while not technically a
violation of the Sherman Act, is contrary to the Act's public policy objectives. FTC v. Beech-
Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922) ("What shall constitute unfair methods of competition
denounced by the [FFCA], is left without specific definition. Congress deemed it better to
leave the subject without precise definition, and to have each case determined upon its own
facts, owing to the multifarious means by which it is sought to effectuate such schemes."); see
also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 236 (1972); Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 (1965); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966); FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948).
115 See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 690; see also FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427
(1920) (It is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as a matter of law what
unfair methods of competition include.).
116 See Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948) (discussing
the functions of divestiture or dissolution).
117 Divestiture is an order of a court that a defendant deprive itself of its title to assets,
such as patents. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 478 (6th ed. 1994). This remedy is considered
particularly appropriate in cases where acquisition of assets or stock violates Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. See United States v. E.I. duPont Nemours, 366 U.S. 316, 328-35 (1961); see also
United States v. Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972).
118 Dissolution is the annulment of the patent, so that it no longer has any binding force.
BLACK'S LAW DICT7IONARY 473 (6th ed. 1994).
119 See infra notes 173-78 for a discussion of compulsory licensing.
120 See infra note 314 and accompanying text; Schine Chain Theaters v. United States,
334 U.S. 110 (1948). "[A]n injunction against future violations is not adequate to protect the
public interest. If all that was done was to forbid a repetition of illegal conduct, those who had
unlawfully built their empires could preserve them intact. They could retain the full dividends
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account not only past violations but present and future conditions in a
particular industry.12'
There are, however, several principles that limit patent antitrust en-
forcement efforts. First, equitable Sherman Act decrees must be reme-
dial, not penal. 122 "[No] conduct or omission is per se punishable [under
the FTCA]"; 123 punishment for individual offenses must remain secon-
dary to the purpose to be accomplished through antitrust decrees. 124 Sec-
ond, even though patentees on occasion may be compelled to sacrifice
pecuniary rewards to avoid trampling public policy, there are limits to
the sacrifices that can be extracted. For example, even where the sim-
plest and most effective method of destroying a monopoly might be an
order of outright dedication of certain assets, narrowly crafted dissolution
or divestiture will be preferred because of the ordinarily non-penal objec-
tives of antitrust decrees. 125 .
Third, although a court may shape any remedy necessary, there
must be a reasonable relationship between the remedy and the antitrust
violation.126 The remedial order must be the most effective in curing the
effects of illegal conduct and assuring the public freedom from continua-
tion of that conduct; 127 the order, in other words, must go no further than
reasonably necessary to correct the evil and preserve the future rights of
of their monopolistic practices and profit from the unlawful restraints of trade which they had
inflicted on competitors." Id. at 128.
121 See Schine Chain Theaters, 334 U.S. at 128.
122 "In actions in equity brought by the Justice Department under the remedial provisions
of § 4 of the Sherman Act,... the Supreme Court has approved or required divestiture for
violations of § 7 of the Clayton Act... and for violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
. ...." In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 538 F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir. 1976) (citation
omitted). Under such circumstances, therefore, the line between remedy and punishment is not
clear.
123 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 483 (1952) ('The commercial discriminations
which [the Act] forbids are those only which meet three statutory conditions and survive the
test of five statutory provisos.").
124 See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 470, 477 (1913) ("So far as is
consistent with this purpose a court of equity dealing with such combinations should conserve
the property interests involved, but never in such wise as to sacrifice the object and purpose of
the statute.").
125 See Schine Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948); United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944) ('The Court has quite consistently recog-
nized in this type of Sherman Act case that the government should not be confined to an
injunction against further violations. Dissolution of the combination will be ordered where the
creation of the combination is itself the violation.").
126 See Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 377 (1965) ("[The Court] will inter-
fere only where there is no reasonable relation between the remedy and the violation.") (cita-
tion omitted); see also American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 771 (6th Cir. 1966)
(citing Atlantic Refining, 381 U.S. at 377); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946).
127 American Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 757.
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competitors and the public. The least confiscatory or drastic means must
be used. 128 Still,
The [court] is not obliged to assume, contrary to com-
mon experience, that a violator of the antitrust laws will
relinquish the fruits of his violation more completely
than the court requires him to do. And advantages al-
ready in hand may be held by methods more subtle and
informed, and more difficult to prove, than those which,
in the first place, win a market. When the purpose to
restrain trade appears from a clear violation of law, it is
not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to that end
be left open and that only the worn one be closed. The
usual ways to the prohibited goal may be blocked
against the proven transgressor and the burden put upon
him to bring any proper claims for relief to the court's
attention.
... [A suit in equity must] effectively pry open to
competition a market that has been closed by defend-
ants' illegal restraints. If [a] decree accomplishes less
than that, the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a
cause. 129
Hence, so long as patent rights are restricted no further than required, are
not being unnecessarily infringed or destroyed, and acts of "unfair com-
petition" are not being punished per se, patents either misused or fraudu-
lently procured in violation of the antitrust laws may be limited,
restricted, or even destroyed. 130
128 See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933); see also Jacob Siegel Co.,
327 U.S. at 612 ("[T]he policy of the law to protect [trade names] as assets of a business
indicates that their destruction 'should not be ordered if less drastic means will accomplish the
same result."' (quoting Royal Milling, 288 U.S. at 217)).
129 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947).
130 But see William B. Miller, Note, Giving the Patent Owner His Due: Recent Develop-
ments in the Antitrust/Patent Misuse Interface, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 135 (1987) (asserting,
while discussing the judicial trends in the interpretation of the National Cooperative Research
Act of 1984, that a less severe application of antitrust laws would improve innovation). For
another, earlier view of the possible effects of overzealous expansion of the patent-antitrust
area from the corporate side, see H. Roy Chope, Conflicts Between the Patent and Antitrust
Laws, 49 J. PAT. OF. Soc'Y. 819 (1967). See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersec-
tion: A Reappraisal, 97 H~Av. L. Rav. 1815 (1984) (developing and proposing a conceptual
solution to the conflict between antitrust law and patent policy which calls into question much
of the earlier analyses of these issues).
1998]
II. PATENT FRAUD AS AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION
For some time, in addition to violating principles of patent law, pat-
ent misuse'M and patent office fraud have also facilitated illegal anticom-
petitive schemes. "[Activities] indulged in for the purpose of seeking to
patent something known by the applicant to be [unpatentable] and as a
part of a scheme to create an illegal monopoly or restrain trade [can also
be] evidence in an action seeking to enforce [the] antitrust statutes [by a
private party seeking damages].' 132
As early as 1948, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 33
the Supreme Court held that the government may directly attack patent
validity based on fraud upon the Patent Office to support a charge that a
defendant violated the Sherman Act by granting licenses under invalid
patents. 34 Since the Gypsum decision, therefore, validity has been open
to direct attack by the government either when raised in defense of con-
duct violative of the Sherman Act 35 or when "related" to such con-
duct.13 6 However, for a patent to be held unenforceable due to fraud, 137
131 See supra note 40.
132 Clinton Engines Corp. v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 175 F. Supp. 390, 406 (E.D. Mich.
1959) (emphasis added); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266
(7th Cir. 1984) (in addition to a showing of fraudulent procurement of a patent, Sherman Act
liability requires proof that the patent was used after its issuance in an anticompetitive
fashion).
133 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
134 Id. The government is only precluded from questioning the competency of its agent or
repudiating the bargain made by it in the absence of fraud. See generally Ford W. Harris,
United States vs. U. S. Gypsum, 26 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 48 (1944).
135 In a later decision, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950),
compulsory licensing was ordered in order to rectify violations of the Sherman Act through the
use of patent licensing agreements to restrain trade and fix prices among all competitors, id. at
94. The government only sought licensing at reasonably royalties, rather than royalty-free
licensing, because changes in Court personnel may have convinced the government that con-
tinuing to argue for free licensing would have been useless. See HARRY ToumLMN, PATENrs
AND THE ANrI-TRUsT LAws OF THE U'irED STATES 16 (Supp. 1969).
136 See Comment, Antitrust & Patents: Government Standing to Challenge Patents in
Antitrust Actions Extended, 58 MwN. L. REv. 307, 310 (1973) (discussing United States v.
Glaxco Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973), which expands Gypsum by holding that the govern-
ment may attack validity even without it being raised as a defense as long as it is "sufficiently
related to an antitrust violation.")
137 Fraud or inequitable conduct before the PTO renders the entire patent unenforceable.
See LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1070 (Fed. Cir.
1992). Such a finding requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of (1) material prior art
or other information that was not disclosed to the Patent Examiner and (2) an intent on the part
of the applicant to mislead the examiner. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister,
Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989). Materiality may
be established "by a showing that a reasonable examiner would consider the withheld prior art
important in deciding whether to issue the patent." Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.,
873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Materiality may also be established by showing that the
withheld prior art reference refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant took in
opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the PTO. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (b)(2).
"When weighing whether uncited prior art is more material than that before the examiner, a
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or to sustain an antitrust damages claim based on fraudulent procure-
ment,13 8 the patentee's misrepresentation to the Patent Office must be
material.139 In addition, it must be shown that the Patent Office relied on
the misrepresentations1 40 and that the applicant made the representations
knowingly and willfully. 4 1 Given those circumstances, attempts to en-
trial court considers similarities and differences between prior art and the claims of the patent."
Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1991). "[The]
more material the omission, the less culpable the intent required, and vice versa." Id. at 1439;
see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
138 There is a distinction between inequitable conduct rendering a patent unenforceable
and inequitable conduct that will support an antitrust claim. The omission or withholding of
relevant information that the applicant has a duty to disclose, for example, may also constitute
fraud violative of the Sherman Act. See Neil A. Smith, Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a
Violation of the Sherman Act, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 337, 357 (1971). Such conduct need not
amount to common law fraud in order to be considered fraud upon the PTO within the mean-
ing of 25 U.S.C. § 285. See Gilbrath Int'l Corp. v. Lionel Leisure, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 605, 608
(E.D. Pa. 1983). The required intent to deceive for an antitrust claim based on fraudulent
procurement is "knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office." Walker
Process Equip. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). In order to estab-
lish a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act based on a patent obtained by fraud, the
antitrust plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant engaged in predatory or anticompetitive
conduct (obtained a patent by fraud); (2) a specific intent to monopolize (initiating litigation);
and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power in the relevant market. See
Abbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205
(1992) (citing Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1431 (6th Cir.,
1990)), cert. denied 502 U.S. 808 (1991); White & White v. American Hosp. Supply Corp.,
723 F.2d 495, 506-07 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
143, 153 (1951)). Under Section 5 of the FTCA, "the Federal Trade Commission must estab-
lish that a fraudulently obtained patent had an adverse effect on competition." Michael A.
Sanzo, Antitrust Law and Patent Misconduct in the Proprietary Drug Industry, 39 ViLLANOVA
L. REv. 1209, 1215 (1994) (citing American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 768 (6th
Cir. 1966).
139 See supra note 137. It has long been argued, however, that deliberate misrepresenta-
tions alone should be enough for non-enforceability, regardless of materiality. See John F.
Carney, Misrepresentations Before the Patent Office: Antitrust and Other Legal Effects, 12
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1005, 1021-24 (1971).
[I]f the issue before the court is the enforceability of a patent, a deliberate misrepre-
sentation should be sufficient to bar enforcement of the patent, regardless of legal
materiality or actual reliance. If the question is whether there is an adequate predi-
cate for a damage action [under antitrust laws], proof of legal materiality may be
considered requisite, but this issue should be decided without any presumption of
materiality favoring the patentee. And finally, there should be no requirement for
proof of actual reliance by the examiner.
Id. at 1024.
140 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 138, at 362.
141 See id. at 369. Thus, good faith is a complete defense to charges of fraudulent pro-
curement. See Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972); Avco Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 84, 94
(D. Mass. 1994) (patent applicant's failure to disclose comparison tests with closest prior art
was not inequitable conduct absent intent to mislead); Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Task
Force Tips, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (fact questions as to whether patentee
intentionally withheld material prior art from the PTO precluded summary judgment on al-
leged infringers' claim that patentee engaged in inequitable conduct).
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force fraudulently obtained patents can violate the antitrust laws.142
Moreover, by 1960 commentators were suggesting that the FTC should
be able to control the use of fraudulent patents143 as part of its remedial
power because the actual or potential economic evil caused by fraudulent
procurement makes it a serious misuse of the patent system.144 It was
still not clear, however, whether conspiracy to fraudulently procure
rather than enforce a patent was itself an antitrust violation.
In United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 145 the Court held that
the Sherman Act was violated by an agreement to terminate an interfer-
ence proceeding in order to facilitate the issuance of a questionable pat-
ent to Singer in return for Singer's promise to cross-license the other
parties to the agreement. 146 In a concurring opinion, Justice White sug-
gested alternatively that a decision might be possible on the ground that
fraudulent termination of Patent Office proceedings was itself a conspir-
acy to restrain trade, an issue expressly reserved by the majority. 147
Since a patent is granted in consideration for the disclosure of novel
ideas of benefit to the public, the suppression of prior art to obtain a
patent which would not otherwise be issued is, he argued, a failure to
142 See infra note 159.
143 See Cullen & Vickers, supra note 14, -at 117-19 (discussing the FTCA § 5 and the
FTC). "Section 5 uses broad language in order to allow flexibility and not to limit narrowly its
applicability. This attempt to protect the public by controlling unfair and deceptive practices
contains no express prohibition which would prevent the FTC from acting in a situation such
as that presented . I... d  at 118 (citation omitted).
144 See id. at 130-34.
145 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
146 The violative agreement was intended to give maximum protection from Japanese
competition to all conspirators. See id. at 178-80. The reason for the agreement was to "'ob-
tain protection against the Japanese machines which might be made . I...' d. at 180 (quoting
the trial court). This collusive settlement was held to be improper and a violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act without any showing of the relevant market. See id. at 199-200. An
antitrust violation may occur where patent litigation is settled in bad faith as part of a scheme
to restrain trade. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
147 Singer, 374 U.S. at 197 (White, J., concurring). Regardless of whether fraudulent
procurement of patents violates the Sherman Act, it is clearly a violation of Section 5 of the
FTCA. See FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934) ('It would not have
been a difficult feat of draftsmanship to have restricted the operation of the Trade Commission
Act to those methods of competition in interstate commerce which are forbidden at common
law or which are likely to grow into violations of the Sherman Act, if that had been the
purpose of the legislation."); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441,453 (1922) ("The
Sherman Act is not involved here except in so far as it shows a declaration of public policy to
be considered in determining what are unfair methods of competition, which the Federal Trade
Commission is empowered to condemn and suppress."). Thus, even if Justice White's views
were not accepted, FTCA Section 5, with its broader scope, probably proscribed such conduct
even prior to Singer. See In re The Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960), aff'd, 300 F.2d 92
(2d Cir. 1962) ("Congress deliberately left the standard of 'unfair methods of competition'
broad, general and flexible in -order to make it applicable not only to practices which were
considered illegal at common law, but to practices and methods of competition yet to be de-
vised by aggressive and vigorous entrepreneurs.").
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give the public its quid pro quo.148 There is, in other words, a public
interest in the patent system which parties cannot subordinate to their
private ends. In Singer, "the public [had] been imposed upon and the
patent clause subverted."149
In Singer, however, no patent had been directly attacked as inva-
lid.150 Consequently, on remand, the lower court found that the unlawful
conspiracy was the mutually advantageous patent cross-licensing agree-
ment and not the fraud in the Patent Office. 151 Moreover, the narrow
remedy deemed adequate to dispel the evil effects of that wrongful con-
duct, as well as to restore competition, was licensing to all on a reason-
able royalty basis. 152 More extreme measures such as royalty-free
licensing or non-enforcement of patents were considered unnecessary. 53
The government, of course, argued that any licensing would only
reward the defendant by permitting it to continue an illegal monopoly,
that the evil lay in the patent enforcement itself, and that unlike ordinary
restrictive licensing violations where compulsory reasonable royalty li-
censing is usually sufficient, only royalty-free licensing would be proper
under these facts.' 54 The Court conceded the government's argument but
cited (1) the Supreme Court's failure to approve royalty-free licensing in
any prior contested case, (2) the principal of Hartford-Empire-that
since validity was not attacked, restraining license enforcement would be
an unreasonable interference with a valid property right, and (3) the
Supreme Court's prior equation of royalty-free licensing with forfei-
ture. 155 The appropriate remedy in cases where patent validity was not
attacked, the Court reiterated, was only that which was necessary to dis-
pel the evil effect of the wrongful conduct and restore competition.156
148 Singer, 374 U.S. at 199-200 ("When there is no novelty and the public parts with the
monopoly grant for no return, the public has been imposed upon and the patent clause sub-
verted.") (citations omitted).
149 Id. "[T]o prevent prior art from coming to or being drawn to the [Patent] Office's
attention is an inequitable imposition on the Office and on the public." Id. at 200 (citations
omitted).
150 Id. at 189.
151 See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 231 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
152 See id.
153 See id. The government demanded royalty-free licensing. This case, it contended,
was distinguishable from precedent that would disallow such a remedy. Yet it was still not
apparent to the court that the violation in Singer was more "serious" than in earlier cases so as
to warrant the more severe remedy of royalty-free licensing. See id. at 243.
154 See id. ("[T]he Government argues that since the offense established was the acquisi-
tion and pooling of patents in order to assert them against competitors, the only effective
means of freeing these competitors from Singer's unlawful exclusion is to deprive Singer of
the benefits it derives from the patents.").
155 See id. at 243-44.
156 See id. at 244.
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Two years later, however, patent validity was attacked directly in
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,157 a patent infringement suit. The defendant counter-claimed that
the plaintiff had obtained and maintained the patent fraudulently and in
bad faith, knowing it to be without basis.' 58 The Supreme Court ruled
that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud may violate the Sher-
man Act,159 and that, "[i]n such event, [the] treble damage provisions of
157 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
158 See id. at 174. After the complaint was dismissed, the defendant in Walker Process
amended its counterclaim stating that the plaintiff "'illegally monopolized interstate and for-
eign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining... its patent...
well knowing that it had no basis for ... a patent."' Id. A plaintiff's failure to plead a
fraudulent patent procurement antitrust claim as a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier in-
fringement action brought by a defendant may be a subsequent bar to that claim under FRCP
13 (a). See USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (patent and anti-
trust claims, although grounded in different legal theories, were essentially identical). But see
Tank Insulation Int'l, Inc. v. Insultherm, Inc., 104 F.3d 83 (5th Cir. 1997) (antitrust suit
brought in response to prior patent infringement suit by plaintiff who was defendant in patent
suit is not barred by reason of plaintiff's failure to assert antitrust claim as compulsory counter-
claim in infringement suit); Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 70 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 1995).
159 The Court, however, refused to allow a claim of patent fraud as a per se illegality
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act because it was "reluctant to extend [that area of the law]
on the bare pleadings and absent examination of market effect and economic consequences."
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 178. Litigation or threats of litigation by patentees, on the other
hand, if made in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing would-be competitors, have long
been held to constitute antitrust violations. See, e.g., American Potato Dryers, Inc. v. Peters,
184 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951). The antitrust laws are vio-
lated, therefore, when patentees attempt to enforce patents known to be invalid. See, e.g.,
Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190
(1985); Conceptual Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262,
1266-67 (D.R.I. 1989) (suits for patent infringement must be brought in good faith). See also
Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 472
U.S. 1018 (1985) (abusive prosecution of patent infringement suits can violate the antitrust
laws even if patents are not obtained by fraud); Kellog Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 71 F.2d
662, 666 (2d Cir. 1934). However, even if the "sole purpose [is] to destroy ... competit[ion],"
plaintiffs are protected from antitrust liability unless the threatened litigation is a sham. East-
ern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1961); see
also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon,
Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) (infringement suits are
presumed to be in good faith because reasonable protection must be afforded to "the honest
patentee who [sues] to protect his legal monopoly."). For the "sham exception" to apply so
that the bringing of a lawsuit can form the basis of an antitrust claim, the alleged infringer has
to establish two distinct elements, one objective and one subjective. See Professional Real
Estate Developers, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). In those in-
stances where antitrust liability on counterclaims to infringement suits have been found under
Walker Process, however, the patentee's conduct has been so egregious as to leave no doubt
that the infringement suit was objectively baseless. See, e.g., Arcade, Inc. v. Minnesota Min-
ing & Mfg. Co., No. CIV-1-88-141, 1991 WL 429344 (E.D. Tenn., Jun. 7, 1991); Conceptual
Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262 (D.R.I. 1989). "[Since] its
creation, [therefore,] the Walker Process antitrust claim has always ieemed to exist in a sort of
patent-antitrust eddy of its own outside of the mainstream of the Noerr line of cases." James
3. Kobac, Jr., Professional Real Estate Investors and the Future of Patent-Antitrust Litigation:
Walker Process and Handgards Meet Noerr-Pennington, 63 ANrrRUST L.J. 185, 193 (1994).
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§ 4 of the Clayton Act would be available to an injured party.' 160 A
direct, private claim of patent fraud as part of an antitrust violation itself
rather than as an equitable defense was no longer barred. The rule that
only the United States could sue to cancel a patent was held to be irrele-
vant since the fraud claim was being made under antitrust law, not patent
law, and did not seek annulment, but only damages. 161
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan emphasized Walker Process dicta
indicating that proof of knowing, willful misrepresentation before the
Patent Office 162 would be sufficient to strip a patent of its exemption
from the antitrust laws.163 He argued that the Walker Process decision
was "aimed ... at achieving a suitable accommodation in this area be-
tween the differing policies of the patent and antitrust laws,"'164 and con-
cluded that, with respect to patents procured by deliberate fraud,
"antitrust remedies should be allowed room for full play."'165 Walker
Process, therefore, set the groundwork for more extreme economic
See, e.g., Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 159 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 818 (1994) ("[i]n a case involving a fraudulently-obtained patent, that which
immunizes the predatory behavior (the patent) is, in effect, a nullity because of the underlying
fraud."); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1241, 1253 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (holding that PRE's two part sham test is inapplicable where there was knowing fraud or
intentional misrepresentations).
160 Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.
161 See id. at 175-76. "The gist of Walker's claim is that since Food Machinery obtained
its patent by fraud it cannot enjoy the limited exception to the prohibitions of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, but must answer under that section and Section 4 of the Clayton Act in treble
damages to those injured by any monopolistic action taken under the fraudulent patent claim."
Id. at 176. "[P]atent owners may [now] incur antitrust liability for enforcement of a patent
known to be obtained through fraud, or known to be invalid, where licenses or a patent com-
pels the purchase of unpatented goods, or where there is an overall scheme to use the patent to
violate the antitrust laws." HARmON, supra note 5, § 11.3, at 457 (citing Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am. Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). A fraudulently procured patent may
serve as the basis of a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Section 5 of the FFC Act.
See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Ameri-
can Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Prelin
Industries, Inc. v. G & G Crafts, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (bad faith efforts to
enforce a fraudulently obtained patent through harassing infringement suits will violate the
antitrust laws).
162 See Cataphote Corp. v. De Soto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972) ("'[k]nowing and willful fraud', as the term is used in
Walker, can mean no less than clear, convincing proof of intentional fraud involving affirma-
tive dishonesty, 'a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud . . . the
Patent Office."').
163 Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177; see, e.g., United States v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 508 F.
Supp. 1157 (D.N.J. 1979) (patent fraud as the basis for a government antitrust action).
164 Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 179.
165 Id. at 180 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Coming Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826 (1967), Walker Process
was construed to "necessarily [assume] that the intentional misrepresentations were a material
factor in obtaining the patent." Id. at 470. "If one were entitled to a patent under the legal
tests of patentability, there is no illegal monopoly resulting from the statements on which to
base an antitrust action." Id.
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repercussions from direct or counter-claims of fraudulent procurement
than had previously been the case.
One remaining question, though, was what "allowing antitrust reme-
dies room for full play" might mean in the patent context. Private par-
ties, of course, have no standing to sue to cancel a patent; but could an
antitrust attack on patent validity result, under certain circumstances, in
non-enforcement of royalty or other patent rights consistent with the
traditional protections of patent and constitutional law?
IV. ALLOWING "FULL PLAY" FOR ANTITRUST REMEDIES:
COMPULSORY REASONABLE ROYALTY AND
ROYALTY-FREE PATENT LICENSING AS
REMEDIES FOR PATENT
FRAUD VIOLATIONS
In 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reviewed a unique order of the FTC in American Cyanamid v. Federal
Trade Commission.166 In that case, the FTC had found that a leading
drug manufacturing company had
made deliberately false and misleading statements to,
and withheld material information from, the Patent Of-
fice in securing [a] patent; that this conduct amounted to
'unclean hands,' 'inequitableness' and 'bad faith' vis-a-
vis the Patent Office; that [said drug company] asserted
monopoly rights under its patent in order to prevent
competition in the... market [for tetracycline, a "won-
der drug"]; and that the effects of [such] acts and con-
duct... have been to restrain competition, to foreclose
access to substantial markets to competitors and poten-
tial competitors, and to create a monopoly ... in viola-
tion of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.167
The FTC's final order, however, recognized the validity of the patents in
question and compelled only reasonable royalty licensing. 168 The FTC
166 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966). Cyanamid decided that conspiracy to fraudulently pro-
cure patents, if it lead to and was part of a scheme that violated the Sherman Act, was an
antitrust violation and could be affirmatively attacked as such if done as part of a general
attack on an anti-competitive scheme. See Carney, supra note 139.
167 American Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 762. The Commission also concluded that the de-
fendants had conspired to fix and maintain the price of this fraudulently patented drug. See id.
at 768.
168 See American Cyanamid et al., 63 F.T.C. 1747 (1963); see also Charles Pfizer & Co.
v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574,586 (6th Cir. 1968) (subsequent decision in case of American Cyanamid
v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966) (affirming ruling that Section 5 of the FrCA had been
violated, providing extracts from commission's final decision and, among other remedies, or-
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decision largely was based on the fact that there was a subsequent use of
the patent to exclude competition 169 and not because of a fraudulent pro-
curement per se. Citing Walker Process and Singer, the Sixth Circuit
agreed that the FTC "[did have] jurisdiction to determine that the con-
duct of the parties before the Patent Office resulting in the issuance of the
patent and the subsequent use of the fruits of that conduct may, in total,
be found to [have] constitute[d] violation of Section 5 of the Act."'170 On
remand, the FTC examiner ruled that not only was there misconduct
before the Patent Office but that, due to such misconduct, Patent Office
officials issued "a patent . . . that otherwise never would have been
issued." 17 1
The decision in American Cyanamid raised several questions. For
example, what can be done about private competitors and government
agencies who are inadequately staffed and funded, and are unable to po-
lice inequitable or fraudulent conduct in cases such as American Cyana-
mid? Antitrust law in the modem era has been extraordinarily solicitous
of patent rights,17 2 but what could more urgently call for remedies tanta-
mount to cancellation than illegal restraints of trade (and the concomitant
unreasonably high prices for vital consumer products) intentionally im-
posed on the basis of patents known to be invalid? Should federal courts
be permitted to order cancellation if necessary, even in private antitrust
litigation? On the other hand, might there be situations where antitrust
enforcement can reasonably require that invalid patents not be divested
of all value, even for a patentee who knowingly obtained it through
fraud?
Compulsory reasonable royalty licensing and even more severe or-
ders such as divestiture or dedication of patents have long been deemed
dering Pfizer to license its patent on tetracycline to any domestic applicant at a royalty of not
more than 2.5%).
169 The Sixth Circuit, in sustaining the Order, did not hold that there was jurisdiction to
invalidate or destroy a patent, nor did it give sanction to any order of compulsory licensing
without payment of reasonable royalties. American Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 772. The Cyana-
mid court only noted that, with regard to an appropriate remedy, the Commission was not
dealing with a patent on an ordinary item of commerce, but with "patents ... of vital impor-
tance... and of tremendous impact upon the public health," and thus the Commission had
jurisdiction to require compulsory licensing on a reasonable royalty basis. Id.
170 Id. Since the Commission's decision as to improper conduct was not supported by
substantial evidence, the entire proceeding was remanded for a de novo hearing on all issues,
including misrepresentation. See Chas. Pfizer & Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 17,773 (Dec. 3, 1966).
171 American Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 772; see also Note, FTC Held to Have Power to
Render Inequitably Procured Patent Unenforceable, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1191 (1963).
172 See Gerald Sobel, The Antitrust Interface with Patents and Innovation: Acquisition of
Patents, Improvement Patents and Grant-backs, Non-Use, Fraud on the Patent Office, Devel-
opment of New Products and Joint Research, 53 ANurrRUsT L.J. 681, 711 (1984) ("The anti-
trust laws have shown [and continue to show] a special solicitude for patents and innovations
in many forms.").
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appropriate antitrust remedies. 173 Fifth Amendment limitations are
largely irrelevant to deprivations of property that might necessarily ensue
from enforcement of the Sherman Act. 174 Where a proclivity for unlaw-
ful activity has manifested, antitrust remedies, which must prevent and
restrain violations, conduct or acts, 175 may "depriv[e] those who have
engaged in [violations] of the weapons which they used in making [the
violations] effective" unless to do so would be purely arbitrary. 176 Thus,
in patent cases where business practices have created an illegal monop-
173 "Mhe [equitable] powers of the courts in civil proceedings.... are practically unlim-
ited.' A.D. NEALE & D.G. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 394 (3d ed. 1980). Courts will strive to find practical, suitable remedies, especially
where "arrangements in the industry systematically discriminated in favour [sic] of the power-
ful ... and against the small man." Id. at 396. Thus "[t]he compulsory licensing of patents for
reasonable royalties has now become to all intents and purposes a routine measure of relief in
cases of monopolization where the company concerned has built up its position largely
through patent holdings." Id. at 409. With regard to the use of compulsory reasonable royalty
or royalty-free licensing, see supra note 13 and accompanying text. Concerning dedication,
see infra notes 219, 230. Divestitures and dissolution are often also appropriate antitrust reme-
dies. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (where Justice
Douglas ruled that, in light of the practical difficulties in administering a compulsory licensing
decree issued below in a complex case, the better relief would be outright divestiture of sub-
stantial assets). But see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), af'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (Judge Wyzanski discussing the reasons for and against
divestitures in a practical context). Divestiture, however, is a more likely remedy in cases
where the antitrust violation is a completed merger which has been held invalid under Section
1 of the Sherman Act or Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (upholding divestiture under Section 7); see also United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (pointing out that the standards for assess-
ing remedies are different from those by which illegality is determined, that economic circum-
stances may make dissolution counterproductive, and that eliminating otherwise lawful
reciprocal patent licensing would be more effective).
174 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 571 (1898). "Among these
limitations and guarantees [are] those which provide that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, and that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. The latter limitation is ... plainly irrelevant." Id.; see
also Philip Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust Judgments through Hartford-Empire,
34 GEO. L.J. 1, 43 (1945).
Under the present state of the law it may be said that although patents are not subject
to forfeiture for violation of the Sherman Act, the patentee does not enjoy an immu-
nity from partial or entire curtailment of normal patent rights where such curtailment
is necessary to remedy an economic condition established by violation of the Sher-
man Act.
Id. at 45.
175 See United States v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 226 U.S. 470, 477 (1913) ("[N]o form of
dissolution [can] be permitted that in substance or effect amounts to restoring the combination
which it was the purpose of the decree to terminate.").
176 Chain Inst., Inc. v. FTC, 246 F.2d 231, 235 (8th Cir. 1957); see United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185-91 (1944) (analyzing the complicated issues
present in a Sherman Act decree). Remedial decrees should operate as "effective deterrent[s]
to a repetition of the unlawful conduct and yet not stand as a barrier to healthy growth on a
competitive basis." Id. at 186.
1998]
502 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
oly and the remedy is deemed essential, 177 compulsory licensing or di-
vestiture of patents are appropriate forms of relief.
Compulsory licensing is usually ordered as an antitrust remedy
where patentees have engaged in licensing practices not contemplated by
the patent laws.178 In the early 1940s, for example, an otherwise valid
patent was unlawfully extended by a conspiracy to fix the prices of ad-
junctive devices not within the claims of the patent. 79 The government
showed an illegal restraint of trade over an infant industry and contended
that the only effective way to dissolve the effects of the monopoly would
be to compel royalty-free, unrestricted licenses. Otherwise, the govern-
ment argued, economic abuse would continue through stealth and con-
cealment. 180 The court refused the suggested remedy, however, because:
at this time, [the court is] not certain the patents in suit
should, as a practical matter, be virtually canceled
by... royalty-free licensing. [The court had] no doubt
that there may be judicial death-sentence of a patent in a
proper case, but [the court] must be convinced that this
is the case. 18'
Nevertheless, a year later, the Supreme Court was more receptive to
the demands for royalty-free licensing.182 In that case, the development
of glass-making machinery had been discouraged in order to maintain the
prices of a defendant's products. 183 Competition in the manufacture, sale
and licensing of such machinery had been suppressed. 184 Furthermore, a
system of restricted licensing among the leaders of the industry had been
employed in violation of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 185 The
177 See Carlisle M. Moore, Note, A Study of Compulsory Licensing and Dedication of
Patents as Relief Measures in Antitrust Cases, 24 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 223, 233 (1955). Even
absent abusive practices in the use of patents, patentees may still be required to license patents
on a reasonable royalty basis to reduce the monopoly power achieved as a result of business
practices. See id.; see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
178 See, e.g., William D. Kilgore, Antitrust Judgments and Their Enforcement, 4 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SEC. RaP. 102, 138 (1954).
179 United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 54 F. Supp. 828 (D. Del. 1944). This behav-
ior, of course, would also violate the patent laws if the patentee sought to enforce the fixed
prices. See supra notes 39, 40.
180 See id. at 841.
181 Id.
182 See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
183 See id. at 392.
184 See id.
185 In 1938, Hartford-Empire had acquired more than 600 patents and merged these by
cross-licensing agreements with more than 240 patents of co-conspirators into a pool which
effectively controlled the industry to the point where "94% of the glass containers manufac-
tured in this country on feeders and formers were made on machinery licensed under the
pooled patents." Id. at 400.
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defendant itself produced nothing, being mainly a patent holding and li-
censing company which controlled and furthered technology and patent
development in the industry. 18 6 The government sought dissolution of
the holding company, but the court was convinced that a continuation of
certain of the defendant's activities would be an advantage to the indus-
try, so it rejected dissolution as a remedy. 187 The decree ordered royalty-
free licensing instead, 188 and was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
In Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,189 the Supreme Court held
that since the decree was not directed at any combination, agreement or
conspiracy, royalty-free licensing went beyond what was required (elimi-
nation of illegal combinations and the prevention of future violations) by
unreasonably confiscating considerable portions of defendant's prop-
erty. 190 "It is to be borne in mind that the Government has not, in this
litigation, attacked the validity of any patent or the priority ascribed by
the Patent Office, nor . . . the standard royalties heretofore exacted
... ."191 The Supreme Court found that the decree was confiscatory and
non-essential.' 9 2 The Court struck193 the provisions that would have pre-
vented infringement suits until violations were dissipated (under the
186 See Joseph Borldn, Patent Abuses, Compulsion to License and Recent Decisions, 43
CoLnum. L. REv. 720, 729-30 (1943) [hereinafter Borkin 1]; see also United States v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 546 (N.D. Ohio 1942), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
187 See Hartford-Empire, 46 F. Supp. at 620.
188 See Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 413; see also Hartford-Empire, 46 F. Supp. at 621
C'Mhe defendants shall be required to license anyone, royalty-free, in the manufacture of
machines embodying these patent rights.").
189 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
190 Id. at 413.
191 Id. at 414.
192 See id.
193 See Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 419. Since the Hartford-Empire majority was ap-
parently unwilling to discredit the ratio decidendi of Morton Salt, there would seem to have
been no justification for denying similar relief in Hartford-Empire. One possible distinction,
however, is that under Morton Salt the patentee is precluded from seeking to enjoin infringe-
ment but can still attempt to collect damages (royalties) in a civil action and, therefore, the
result would not be total forfeiture. See Note, Hartford-Empire v. United States: Integration of
the Anti-Trust and Patent Laws, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 601, 618-19 (1945) [hereinafter Hartford-
Empire Note]. However, since equitable defenses would continue to be available, even the
damage remedy might be denied, and this argument would be nullified. See id. Another way
of harmonizing Morton Salt and Hartford-Empire is to limit Morton Salt to cases in which the
issue of reasonable royalties are not raised, thereby at least denying rewards to the patentee in
infringement suits. It would seem to follow from the refusal to grant royalty-free licenses in
Hartford-Empire that an infringer in the future could successfully defend by offering to pay
reasonable royalties. ld.
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Morton Salt doctrine). 194 In addition, the Court set royalties at reason-
able rates. 195
Controversy surrounded this case due, in large measure, to the well
written dissents. 196 Justice Black argued that the lower court actually
had fashioned the most effective remedial decree, one "admirably suited
to neutralize the consequences of such violations, to guard against repeti-
tion of similar illegal activities, and dissipate the unlawful aggregate of
economic power which arose out of, and fed upon, monopolization and
restraints."' 97 Since the patents were the major weapons in the campaign
to subjugate the industry as well as the fruits of defendant's victory, Jus-
tice Black argued, restoration of competition demanded that defendants
be deprived of these weapons, and the most effective way to accomplish
this was to require royalty-free licensing. 198
Justice Rutledge's dissent urged closer examination of "the com-
plete picture,"'199 which is not only pertinent to liability but also bears
upon the character of relief required to uproot the combination's destruc-
tive and unlawful effects. 200 The court below is most familiar with the
facts, he said, and it must be allowed to judge whether or not a remedy is
194 "Equity may rightly withhold its assistance . . . by declining to entertain a suit for
infringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has
been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated."
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942); see supra notes 39, 40 and
accompanying text.
195 See Hartford-Empire Note, supra note 193, at 622-23
The Supreme Court modified [the decree] to include compulsory licensing, but at
reasonable royalties, and only with relation to patents on the four major machines
and their improvements. Its modifications were based on the theory that the original
provision would effect a confiscation of the defendant's property which was not
essential to termination of the illegal combination.
Id. The government had argued that royalty-free licensing was necessary to restore competi-
tion in the industry, that a continued right to royalties would give defendants an advantage
which would discourage creation of a competitive industry. Permitting a charge for entrance
into the industry, said the government, could perpetuate the monopoly indefinitely. See Gov-
ernment's Brief on Re-argument at 79, 94, 95, Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U.S. 386
(1945) (No. 4426). Newcomers would not enter a heavily controlled industry faced with an
imposition of royalties. See Government's Main Brief, Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323
U.S. 386 (1945) (No. 4426). These arguments, as well as the government's additional argu-
ment that defendant's wrongful acts in procuring and later abusing the patents made them
unenforceable, id., ultimately failed because the economic situation the government described
as "evil" was actually shown to be advantageous. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying
text. Reasonable royalties were desired by both actual and potential competitors as a means to
further industry-wide progress. See Government's Main Brief, supra.
196 "These dissenting opinions are of importance because the view which they embody
tended later to become dominant in the courts." NEaLAE & GOYDER, supra note 173, at 408.
197 Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 435 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Cres-
cent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944)).
198 See id. at 436-37.
199 Id. at 440 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
200 Id.
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essential in the context of what is often a complex situation.20' There is
no "clear, sharp line which can be drawn on the crux of past and future,
between punishment and prevention or dissipation .... ,,2o
The majority, said Justice Rutledge, also "ignores the momentum
inherent in this combination. '20 3 Royalty-free licensing was particularly
justified here, he suggested, because the violation was gross, had contin-
ued for quite some time, and, consequently, it was no longer possible to
discern which patents were or were not legally obtained.2 °4
To permit the continued collection of royalties would be
to perpetuate, for the lives of the patents, the illegal con-
sequences of the violations. That the court is bound, in
equity, and by statute, not to do. [The court, in] seeking
to avoid dissolution, has the duty to apply a remedy
equally adequate. It could not do this, if the [patents re-
mained as a] continuing source of revenue to the viola-
tors and a burden to the public. 20 5
Justice Rutledge noted that royalty-free licensing does not deprive de-
fendants of the rights of ownership to the same extent as would cancella-
tion,206 but even if it did, when a patentee overreaches the boundary of
his patent, there is sufficient reason to deny the patentee the usual protec-
tion of the holder of property; "[t]hat this ordinarily has been done in
infringement suits or suits for cancellation does not qualify . . . the
policy. '20 7
In United States v. National Lead Co.,20 8 however, decided just two
years later, the Court pointed out that the interest in promoting future
industry-wide competition may occasionally outweigh the policy of de-
priving defendants of the fruits of patent fraud.209 There, an action was
brought to enjoin the wrongful use of patents to control the manufacture
and use of titanium pigments.210 Once again, the validity of the patents
was not at issue, so a decree ordering compulsory licensing at reasonable
royalties was deemed appropriate: (1) the infant industry was still grow-
ing, (2) there were four competitors, only two of whom had conspired,
201 See id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 442.
204 See id. at 450.
205 Id. at 450-51.
206 See id. at 450-51. For additional, similar comparisons with the antitrust remedy of
dedication see supra note 13.
207 Id. at 452-53; see also supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
208 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
209 Id. at 367.
210 See id. at 325.
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and (3) there was a strong threat of foreign competition.21' Royalty-free
licensing was thought to be unnecessary to enforce the Sherman Act be-
cause the growing strength of the two royalty-paying firms demonstrated
that royalty-free licensing was not essential to economic progress. 212
The Court indicated, however, that such relief still might be possible
where more clearly required than had been proven below.2 13 "[It] may
well be thai uniform, reasonable royalties computed on some patents will
be found to be but nominal in value,"214 or that extreme difficulty in
fixing a proper royalty may be a "proper case" [for royalty-free
licensing].215
Justice Douglas, in his National Lead dissent,2 16 argued that, in light
of the defendant's impregnable position, stronger measures should have
been adopted to allow new ventures to compete with established giants
because "[e]ach dollar of royalty adds a dollar to the costs of the new
competitor and gives the established licensor another dollar with which
to fight that competition."2 17 Where licensor and licensee compete, he
211 See id. at 338-40. "[W]ithout reaching the question whether royalty-free licensing or
perpetual injunction against the enforcement of a patent is permissible as a matter of law in
any case, the present [reasonable royalty] decree represents an exercise of sound judicial dis-
cretion." Id. at 338.
212 See id. at 351.
213 "We do not, in this case, face the issue of the constitutionality of such an order. That
issue would arise only in a case where the order would be more necessary and appropriate to
the enforcement of the Antitrust Act than here." Id. at 349. These comments may have been
provoked by the fact that "[it] was widely believed at that time that this remedy could hardly
fail to be punitive and even that it ought not to be applied without specific legislative author-
ity." NEALE & GOYDER, supra note 173, at 410.
214 National Lead, 332 U.S. at 349. "[T]o reduce all royalties automatically to a total of
zero, regardless of their nature and regardless of their number, appears, on its face, to be
inequitable without special proof to support such a conclusion." Id.
215 Id. at 349-50. In United States v. American Optical Co., 95 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y.
1950), after entering a consent judgment canceling certain licenses and ordering compulsory
licensing of numerous patents following evidence of the history of royalties in the industry, the
court established a reasonable royalty of three cents as opposed to four cents asked by the
defendant (although a licensee claimed that "zero" was the reasonable royalty). Id. at 776.
Interpreting National Lead, the court said that although "difficulty" in fixing royalties is "ex-
treme" ("fixing a reasonable royalty where an established royalty does not prevail presents
many difficulties"), when none are established, "the best estimate ... under the circum-
stances is that three cents is a reasonable royalty .. .." Id.
216 National Lead, 332 U.S. at 364.
217 Id. at 368.
Divestiture or dissolution may be ordered in spite of hardship, inconvenience, or
loss. Devices or instrumentalities which may be used for legitimate ends may never-
theless be outlawed entirely where they have been employed to build the monopoly
or to create the restraint of trade. For the aim of the decree is ... to undo what has
been done, to neutralize power unlawfully acquired, to prevent the defendants from
acquiring any of the fruits of the condemned project.
Id. at 366-67 (citations omitted).
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concluded, the royalty-payor will always be at a disadvantage. 218 Never-
theless, Justice Douglas failed to discuss the question of the constitution-
ality of decrees ordering royalty-free patent licensing.
V. DEDICATION AS COMPARED TO ROYALTY-FREE
LICENSING IN ANTITRUST DECREES ADDRESSING
PATENT FRAUD
Patent dedication has long been treated as similar to compulsory
licensing but with a somewhat more narrow utility.219 In United States v.
General Instrument Corp.,220 for example, the government asked for
dedication of patents because the corporate defendants had attempted to
exclude potential competition from the manufacture and sale of radio
variable condensers by continuing agreements and concerted action.221
A sizable, effective competitor existed, however, notwithstanding the de-
fendants' patent pooling.222 Thus, simply ending cooperation effectively
divided business and patent ownership among sufficiently diverse and
competitive firms; compulsory licensing, at reasonable royalties, was
enough to free competition and make defendants completely independent
of one another.223 Notwithstanding defendants' past pattern of conduct,
and their relative dominance in the industry, the most effective remedy
for the existing lack of competition was to simply deprive defendants of
their ability to condition licensing upon reciprocal licensing.224 Dedica-
tion of patents was unnecessary:
[This was] not a situation where one enormous firm in
an industry, overshadowing all competitors, owned a
huge bundle of patents with which it maintained its dom-
inance in violation of the antitrust laws and with which,
even were it compelled to license at reasonable royalties,
it could preserve a competitive edge by virtue of the drag
218 Id. (referencing the brief by National Lead). Thus, even with compulsory licensing,
the goal of assuring future entry for competitors may not be achieved. See Kilgore, supra note
178, at 139, 141.
219 See NoRDHtAus, supra note 13, at § 104C-1. "[These forms of relief] are not, however,
identical in legal effect." Id. "[Dedication] is a very severe equitable remedy of dubious con-
stitutionality [and, when ordinary compulsory licensing is inadequate, alternatives are recom-
mended, such as ordering a defendant] to divest itself, by sale, of all interest in the patents
[used] in violation of the antitrust laws [similar] to the ordering of divestiture or dissolution."
Id. at §104C-2.
220 115 F. Supp. 582 (D.N.J. 1953).
221 Id. at 590.
222 See id. at 591.
223 See id at 591.
224 See id. at 593.
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such royalties would have on the success of its
competitors. 225
However, the facts in United States v. General Electric C0.,226 de-
cided the same year, apparently met the criteria for dedication. General
Electric had attempted to maintain control of the lamp industry by ex-
tending its basic patents on lamps.2 27 Only the prospective free use of
patents could check the advantages gained through both patent misuse
and antitrust violations.2 28 "Where the profit margin [in this industry] is
as narrow as it is at the present [time, said the district court, any royal-
ties] may prove an important factor in limiting or inhibiting the growth of
competition. '229
Decisions like General Electric, which describe circumstances ap-
propriate for the dedication of patents, suggest a basis for similar reme-
dies, such as compulsory royalty-free licensing, which also remove,
albeit temporarily, the economic rewards of patents.230  The General
Electric court ordered dedication in order to remedy existing anti-com-
petitive conditions, but with a view toward the future market: "In view of
the fact that General Electric achieved its dominant position in the indus-
try and maintained it ... by its extensive patent control[, dedication of
patents] is only a justified dilution of that control made necessary in the
interest of free competition in the industry. ' 231 Dedication was neces-
sary, aside from any question of fraud or invalidity, because the rest of
225 Id. at 591.
226 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
227 See id. at 844.
228 See id.
229 Id.
230
In . . . circumstances such as these it would appear that royalty-free licensing of
patents... is an essential remedy as a preventive against a continuance of monopoly
... . It would appear no more confiscatory than where compulsory licensing is
ordered. In the latter case the owner admittedly is permitted to receive a royalty but
he nevertheless loses a monopoly inherent in his ownership of the patent ....
Royalty free licensing and dedication are but an extension of the same principle ....
Id. Although they are not identical in legal effect, compulsory royalty-free licensing and dedi-
cation "are to a great extent similar remedies." NORDHAUS, supra note 13, § 104C. See Note,
Compulsory Licensing of Patents by the Federal Trade Commission, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,
546-48 (1964) [hereinafter Compulsory Licensing Note] (discussing General Electric):
Despite the distinctions between public dedication of patents and royalty-free licens-
ing, the justification for the action in General Electric can be applied to a decree for
royalty-free licensing. While in a given situation small competitors may not be able
to afford to pay royalties, even if set at a reasonable rate, it may still be desirable to
permit the patentee to retain the rights to the results of its research. Thus by ordering
royalty-free licensing, a court can achieve free competition in a given industry with-
out permanently depriving the patentee of its patent rights.
Id. at 547.
231 General Elec., 115 F. Supp., at 844.
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the industry was financially unequipped to defend infringement litigation
or contest the validity of General Electric's huge body of patents.232
Unfortunately, General Electric fails to explain why dedication
rather than the arguably less confiscatory imposition of royalty-free li-
censing was appropriate for some patents but not for others. That Gen-
eral Electric's competitors ultimately might shoulder royalties would not
have proven to be the factor that would have made them uncompeti-
tive;233 royalty-free licensing had been ordered on other patents to pre-
vent a continuation of monopoly.234 Compelling free, unrestricted
licensing could have destroyed the monopoly inherent in patent owner-
ship in much the same way as dedication while not removing title, and
both forms of relief were equally well within the therapeutic measures to
be administered under these facts.235
Yet, as in General Electric, royalty-free licensing is not imposed as
often as dedication. This may be because free licensing was originally
designed for conditions arising where an industry is totally dominated by
a single firm rather than the much more usual situation where competi-
tion is still viable.236 The General Electric court, for example, explained
that in granting compulsory royalty-free licensing where it did, it was
merely rectifying just such a monopoly, one which arose as a result of
the defendant's economic violations and could not otherwise be cor-
rected.237 General Electric also suggests that dedication is proper where:
232 See id.
233 See General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. at 848. In fact, General Electric had liberal
royalty policies, and no evidence was adduced indicating that any competitor was actually
forced out. But see United States v. General Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157 (D.N.J. 1949)
(wholly innocent acts, such as establishing royalties, are prohibited by the Sherman Act if they
result in a monopoly). "'T]he power to fix and maintain royalties is tantamount to the power
to fix prices."' Id. at 191 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 174
(1931)).
234 See General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. at 844.
235 See id. at 844-45. Actually, the court stated that abuse of patents such as this would
even justify invalidation of the patents themselves, i.e., a dissolution of all the monopoly origi-
nally granted in the patent Id. at 845. However, unless the government is simultaneously
suing for cancellation, it is doubtful that any court of equity would assume the remedial power
or jurisdiction to cancel a patent for antitrust violations. The different treatment of patents in
General Electric may have reflected the relative seriousness of the violations involving their
use or the differing effect upon the industry of a given remedy in relation to the actual licens-
ing practices General Electric had in effect for the various patents. That is, the decision re-
garding dedication may have been based on the fact that relative abuse of the dedicated patents
was of such serious degree as to constructively destroy their validity and justify such drastic
treatment. See Moore, supra note 177, at 232.
236 See Compulsory Licensing Note, supra note 230, at 547-48.
237 General Elec., 115 F. Supp. at 844; see also H.B. Rubenstein, Comment, Patents -
Compulsory Licensing - Dedication to the Public, 27 Tatp. L.Q. 504, 511 (1954). "The belief
that property and property rights are sacred has persisted from early common law. To many
courts, recognizing and strictly interpreting the patent as property, it would be contrary to the
American sense of justice to induce an inventor to make a public disclosure of his invention
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(a) the essence of the antitrust violation is the misuse of defendant's pat-
ent; (b) there has been a violation of both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act; (c) complete elimination of the patent monopoly is the key to
the restoration of competitive conditions; and (d) dedication will be
neither detrimental nor unnecessary to the restoration of competition. 238
General Electric, therefore, seems grounded on the rationale that
the interest against confiscation of private property will be outweighed
by the compelling need to restore and maintain competition in an indus-
try severely burdened by the results of patent misuse.239 The decision is
reconcilable on its facts with National Lead2 40 and Hartford-Empire.24 1
Viewed together, these cases provide insight into the relationship be-
tween antitrust remedies and violations under circumstances where pat-
ents are involved.
The decree in General Electric, for example, was well justified by
the economic structure of the industry. Earning ninety percent of indus-
try profits, General Electric towered above its competitors in size and
market control, while narrow profit margins made royalties critical to the
competition. 242 The corporation was primarily a manufacturer to whom
income from patent royalties was not of critical importance. 243 Actually,
many of the dedicated patents were unimportant or unused, and General
Electric had already suspended the practice of licensing.244 Of critical
importance to the court was the fact that General Electric's huge research
and then deprive him of its benefits." Id. "[However, in] spite of Congressional silence, and
although aware of the peculiar nature of the patent as property, such provisions are deemed
imperative to combat the formation and propagation of monopolies." Id.
238 See Moore, supra note 177, at 233-34; see also, General Elec., 115 F. Supp. at 844-
45.
239 See Rubenstein, supra note 237, at 511:
One view insists that the patent owner is to be protected in his property, that any
forfeiture of that property is an unconstitutional deprivation of his right, that in order
to preserve unequivocal freedom, there could be no circumstances ever justifying
such an invasion. On the other hand, it is contended that since the patent monopoly
is a privilege granted by the government as an incentive to inventors, this property
right is not an inherent right. It is merely a right arising out of that privilege, an
abuse of which may justify the government in its termination.
Id. Furthermore, "[if] the Government can obtain cancellation of a patent upon a showing of
fraud and if infringement suits may be denied on a lesser showing of unclean hands in the
procurement, due process will surely not forbid royalty-free licensing on a similar showing of
unclean hands." Note, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial Power,
77 HARv. L. REV. 1505, 1518 (1964) [hereinafter Improperly Procured Note].
240 See supra notes 208-18 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 177-204 and accompanying text.
242 See United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 863"(D.N.J. 1953).
243 See id. at 862.
244 See Note, Patent Dedication as Antitrust Remedy: New Light on Hartford-Empire, 63
YALE L.J. 717, 723 (1954) [hereinafter Patent Dedication Note].
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and technological advantage made dedicating the patents (and sharing
the "know-how") essential if smaller firms were to catch up.245
In National Lead, however, patents were properly acquired but mis-
used later in a patent pool.24 6 Thus, the Court avoided the question of
the legality of patent dedication in that case by finding that "there [would
have been] no illegal aggregation of patents in one firm, upon cancella-
tion of the licenses, as there was in General Electric."247 The two princi-
pal producers in National Lead were strong enough to counterbalance
each other and were in active competition, while the two smaller firms
were healthy and growing in spite of royalty payments. 248 Based on the
character of the offense, and those conditions in that industry,24 9 reason-
able royalty payments were probably justified.25 0
In Hartford-Empire, on the other hand, the holding company had no
substantial source of income except patent royalties. 25 1 Its ability to fi-
nance research and development helpful to smaller producers in its in-
dustry would have been greatly impaired by the loss of income resulting
from compulsory royalty-free licensing. 25 2 Consequently, even if Hart-
ford's coercive practices in acquiring and utilizing its patent monopoly
might have justified royalty-free licensing, such relief would have hin-
dered competition. Royalty-free licensing was inappropriate, therefore,
not because it exceeded remedial power per se, but because it was more
245 See id. at 722.
246 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 348 (1947).
247 Patent Dedication Note, supra note 244, at 723.
248 National Lead, 332 U.S. at 347-48.
249 The decision in United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215, 224
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), in reaffirming Morton Salt, reiterated one of the key elements in the ratio
decidendi of National Lead: "[Platent rights do not differ essentially in character from any
other rights which the law creates or recognizes." Id. at 224-25. Imperial Chemical held that
mere misuse of patents does not require a forfeiture but "only suspends the rights of the paten-
tee to obtain judicial relief so long as misuse continues or its effects have not been dissipated."
Id. at 224. Further, that court suggested that, since the validity of no patent was questioned by
the government, to provide for royalty-free licenses would be to unnecessarily destroy the total
value of the patent. See id. at 223. Free licensing, however, might last only a few years. The
patent still remains an asset on the books of account; title still remains; and enforcement may
be possible against a later infringer (a court, in the later suit, having declared the patentee to
have dissipated the effects of earlier misuse). Therefore, the patent does in fact have remain-
ing "value" for future sale or asset valuation. Also, in United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corporation, 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), compulsory li-
censing itself was held to not be punishment for prior abuse. Id. at 351. Rather, compulsory
licensing was necessary to "reduce monopoly power [obtained], not as a result of patents, but
as a result of business practices. Thus, compulsory licensing, on a reasonable royalty basis, is
in effect [only] a partial dissolution, on a non-confiscatory basis." ld.
250 See National Lead, 332 U.S. at 349.
251 United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 546 (N.D. Ohio 1942), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
252 See id. at 594.
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confiscatory than necessary to promote competition. 253 In general, how-
ever, there seems to be no reason why those acting in restraint of compe-
tition should have a vested right to receive the benefits of unlawful acts
through royalties.
Where patents are misused through business practices that violate
the antitrust laws, or are attacked as to validity, compulsory patent li-
censing may often be the most reasonable non-confiscatory remedy, hav-
ing only the effect of partial dissolution.254 On occasion, however,
circumstances are serious enough to call for the elimination of all royalty
payments, and, given the economic incentives toward subversion of the
patent process, it would seem important to articulate discrete criteria
under which royalty-free licensing-still considered unusual and severe
in litigated antitrust cases and arguably unconstitutional255-would be an
appropriate remedy to impose in situations involving patent fraud.
25 6
VI. PUBLIC POLICY, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN WALKER
PROCESS LITIGATION, AND THE UNIQUE UTILITY
OF COMPULSORY ROYALTY-FREE
LICENSING: CRITERIA AND
JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS USE IN PATENT FRAUD
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
A. CONSENT DECREES
One significant problem in discerning or developing criteria for a
situation where a decree of compulsory free licensing might be appropri-
ate in litigated matters is the peculiar nature of the consent decree and its
impact in antitrust enforcement. Consent decrees are an important and
253 See Patent Dedication Note, supra note 244, at 724:
Decrees imposing unnecessary or inappropriate impairment of property rights are
subject to reversal as much on the constitutional grounds of confiscation of property
without due process as on abuse of discretion. General Electric construes Hartford-
Empire, read together with National Lead, as making no sweeping prohibition of
dedication or royalty-free licensing. It establishes a double requirement for dedica-
tion: if the essence of antitrust violation is monopolization of patents, and if the
complete elimination of that monopoly is the key to restoration of competitive condi-
tions, then dedication is a permissible remedy.
254 But see N. R. Powers, Comment, The Patent-Antitrust Balance: Proposals for
Change, 17 ViLE. L. REv. 463, 468-70 (1972) (arguing that under these circumstances a paten-
tee should be permitted to license whomever at terms "reasonable" to the enjoyment of its
patent grant and, further, that the patentee should be allowed ample freedom in the manner of
acceptable compensation for the licensing of its patent.)
255 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
256 One type of case, for example, where an order of royalty free licensing would appear
necessary is where the patent holder was disproportionately powerful over the other competi-
tors in that requiring them to pay any royalties would keep them out entirely. See Improperly
Procured Note, supra note 239, at 1519.
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much-used means of enforcing the antitrust law.257 They are usually ob-
tained by agreement for economic reasons peculiar to the parties, for
reasons related to litigation strategy, or where, because of prior decisions
or the flagrancy of the violations charged, the results of adjudication
would be fairly certain.258
The forms of specific relief in consent decrees to which parties to
antitrust cases have agreed when patents have been involved are varied.
Most courts stress current economic considerations when deciding
whether to order compulsory licensing (some concluding, as a result, that
only in limited circumstances should there be royalty-free licensing);259
the emphasis of many other courts which have favored dedication or roy-
alty-free licensing has been on past conduct instead.260  Royalty-free,
non-exclusive, unrestricted licenses or sublicenses on patents, and even
outright dedication, are, in any event, often found in consent decrees.261
257 A consent decree is a negotiation between the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and an antitrust violator. It is an efficient alternative to complex, lengthy, and expen-
sive litigation. See A. Bruce Campbell, Antitrust Consent Decrees: A Proposal to Enlist Pri-
vate Plaintiffs in Enforcement Efforts, 54 CoRNLL L. REv. 763, 763 (1969). Consent decrees
also serve to clarify to other businesses what conduct the Department of Justice considers
anticompetitive and subject to prosecution. See Andrea Berger Kalodner, Consent Decrees as
an Antitrust Enforcement Device, 23 ANurrIwsT BuLL. 277, 278 (1978). As part of the negoti-
ations, the defendant agrees to refrain from the 'offensive' conduct in exchange for the govern-
ment forbearing formal prosecution (litigation). See Clark E. Walter, Consent Decrees and the
Judicial Function, 20 CAmH. U. L. Rnv. 312, 315 (1970). The result is a consent decree, which
must be ratified by the court. See id. at 315. The settlement of an antitrust case by consent
decree is an administrative decision and, therefore, is not subject to judicial review, although
the decree may be disproved by legal considerations. See United States v. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n,
307 F. Supp. 617, 620-21 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd per curtam sub nom. City of N.Y. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
258 See supra note 24; see also NEALE & GoYDR, supra note 173, at 380.
259 General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. at 844; see also Floyd H. Crews, Is It Necessary to
Sacrifice Patent Property in Antitrust Consent Decrees? The Effect Upon the Patent System,
41 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 801 (1959) (criticizing compulsory royalty free licensing in consent
decrees where they receive no judicial review and as a result may be unnecessarily
confiscatory).
260 See, e.g., United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
261 Consent decrees and orders which, for example, require partial divestiture, occasion-
ally require ancillary relief aimed at improving the competitive condition of the pre-acqnisition
marketplace, including compulsory patent licensing, often royalty free. See, e.g., United States
v. United Techs. Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,792 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Eli Lilly & Co.,
3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,612 (FTC 1980) (consent order requiring royalty-free licensing
under existing insulin-related patents to any foreign company); United States v. Merck & Co.,
1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,682 (S.D. Cal. 1980); United States v. Am. Tech. Indus., Inc.,
1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,376 (M.D. Pa. 1974), entered as final, 1975-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,467 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (judgment required manufacturer of artificial Christmas trees
to offer royalty-free licensing for all patents owned or developed by an illegally acquired
manufacturer); Illinois Cent. Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1097 (1973) (consent order requiring,
among other things, that corporation create a viable new entrant in the business of manufactur-
ing auto brake friction materials by either divesting necessary equipment or providing the new
entrant with sufficient financial aid or technical assistance and granting new firm royalty-free
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These orders, however, are largely silent as to the specific legal justifica-
tions for chosen remedies. 262 This practice, consistent with Section 5 of
the Clayton Act, expresses a public policy strongly encouraging settle-
ment through consent decrees. 263 Nevertheless, where they voluntarily
substitute royalty-free licensing for the normal rules governing patents,
antitrust consent decrees afford an opportunity to examine circumstances
which parties themselves thought justified this remedy in many of the
usual areas of patent system operation.
Consent decrees involving compulsory licensing are usually entered
in cases where the government has alleged that patents are the source of
the economic power by which a restraint of trade has been effected, and
where courts can assume that, by opening patents to use by all for rea-
sonable royalties, the prospects for restoring a competitive order are sig-
nificantly increased. 264 In United States v. Spectra-Physics, Inc.,265 for
example, the acquisition of another corporation by Spectra-Physics was
alleged to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act because it substantially
lessened competition in the development, manufacture and sale of laser-
based machine control products and systems. The proposed final consent
judgment required, inter alia, the royalty-free licensing of patents on
machine control laser technology.266
licensing on related U.S. patents held by respondent); United States v. Hercules, Inc., 1973-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,530 (D. Del. 1973); Continental Oil Co., 72 F.T.C. 850 (1967); Phillips
Petroleum Co., 70 F.T.C. 456 (1966); see also United States v. Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n of
the United States, Inc., 643 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981) (where it was alleged that the four leading
automobile makers had used cross-licenses to suppress development of pollution control
equipment, defendants accepted a consent decree under which they agreed to offer royalty-free
licensing to anyone interested in developing air pollution control technology); International
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Haw. 1972) (litigated judgment),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975); Moore, supra note 177, at 228. For a
typical pre-Walker Process consent decree, see United States v. Parke, Davis Co., 1951 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,914 (E.D. Mich. 1951).
262 See Moore, supra note 177, at 228-34 and note 19.
263 One of the most potent weapons available to the Antitrust Division is the fact that an
antitrust defendant is often forced to avoid "investment decisions and business opportunities
because of uncertainty regarding the outcome of litigation [and the] potential effects on the
firm's future business practices .... " Moore, supra note 177, at 135 (citing 9 VON KALINOW-
SKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §§91.09(1)(b), 96.01(1)(a) (1992)). It is clear
that the substantial immunity from private antitrust actions provided by consent decrees is a
primary consideration in any defendant's willingness to negotiate them. Clearly justified or-
ders of royalty-free licensing in litigated cases, on the other hand, might open the "floodgates"
of litigation seeking free licensing against other patentees. See NEALE & GOYDER, supra note
173, at 380.
264 See Kilgore, supra note 178, at 115; see also supra note 13.
265 No. C-78-1879-TEH, 1981 WL 2137, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1981).
266 See id.; United States v. Spectra-Physics, Inc. and Laserplane Corp.: Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 46 Fed. Reg. 31095, 31096-98 (1981); 1981-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,290 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (consent decree).
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The government originally sought divestiture of the acquired corpo-
ration's assets but ultimately concluded that compulsory royalty-free li-
censing would be adequate under these circumstances. 267 Because of the
nature of the product market and the current state of development, the
acquired assets eventually had relatively less competitive importance,
while Spectra-Physic's technology had relatively more importance: 268
the market had experienced substantial entry by new competitors since
the suit was filed, and compulsory royalty-free licensing could be ex-
pected to provide additional encouragement to new entry.269 Finally, di-
vestiture would have been more difficult than in the typical Section 7
case because many of the assets were non-divisible.270 Therefore, the
government concluded that royalty-free licensing would remedy the an-
ticompetitive effects of the acquisition as adequately as divestiture:271
Compulsory royalty-free licensing should remedy the in-
creased concentration and the other anticompetitive ef-
fects of the acquisition. Existing competitors in the
market may be able to [improve] their products and in-
crease sales by obtaining licenses. Licensing may also
attract new entry, particularly from manufacturers of
heavy machinery which would be likely entrants but for
their lack of [expertise] in laser systems. Licensing will
also permit both new entrants and existing competitors
to expand sales without the threat or fear of any suit for
patent infringement. 272
Free licensing decrees are also justified by the persuasive notion
that the more serious the abuse of the patent system, the more severe
should be the patent restriction.27 3 When royalty-free licensing is part of
remedial rectification of past conduct that has seriously restrained com-
petition, such as the fraudulent procurement of patents in order to control
a nascent industry, the desired antitrust goals are more often achieved. 274
267 See 46 Fed. Reg. at 31098 (The complaint alleged an illegal acquisition, the remedy
for which would ordinarily be divestiture under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.).
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See id.
271 See id.
272 IL But see FTC v. Brunswick Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,740 (F.T.C.
1980) (decree ordered divestiture but denied mutual royalty-free licensing of patents as
unnecessary).
273 Serious abuses, for example, might be antitrust violations judged to be extremely con-
trary to public standards of fair play. See Improperly Procured Note, supra note 239, at 1511-
12; see also Carney, supra note 139.
274 See Kilgore, supra note 178, at 116.
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B. PATENT ANTITRUST, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE ARGUMENT FOR
ROYALTY-FREE LICENSING UNDER WALKER PROCESS
More than fifty years ago, the ineffectiveness of Justice Department
cancellation suits,275 the most obvious remedy for fraudulently obtained
patents, led to the suggestion that other possible approaches should at
least be investigated.276 There is a heavy burden on the Patent Office
and it is quite possible that patent fraud would not be challenged at all if
not through antitrust litigation. 27 7 The overwhelming quantity of possi-
bly germane data, the relatively limited number of patent examiners, and
a highly subjective statutory standard,2 78 render it nearly impossible to
filter out invalid patents prior to their issuance.279 Making matters
worse, it is still not clear that there is an obligation on the part of paten-
tees to search for and disclose material information to the Patent Office;
a duty of candor to the PTO exists only with regard to prior art known to
the inventor.280
Nonetheless, the government has standing to challenge the validity
of patents directly involved in antitrust violations, even if the patent was
not relied upon as a defense.281 Furthermore, attempts to enforce fraudu-
lently obtained patents constitute violations of Section 5 of the FTCA.282
275 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
276 See Note, Compulsory Patent Licensing by Antitrust Decree, 56 YAL L.J. 77, 117
(1946) [hereinafter Compulsory Patent Note] (suggesting the FFC, the Sherman Act and a
defense by infringers of fraud on the Patent Office as possible alternatives).
277 The Patent Office checks formal requirements and examines to see if the invention is
patentable based only upon the facts presented before the Patent Office. In applying for a
patent before the United States Patent Office, the prosecution of the patent is accomplished ex
parte, and the Patent Office typically takes the applicants' representations at face value.
Therefore, parties willing to make false statements in the oath accompanying the application
are not prevented from doing so. See Richard A. Joel, Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent,
49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 596, 597-98 (1967). The burden is on the examiner to indicate why the
applicant is not entitled to a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994).
278 See generally Cullen & Vickers, supra note 14 (tracing the history and difficulties
associated with the process of declaring a patent fraudulent).
279 See id. See generally Joel, supra note 277.
280 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1985).
281 See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1973); see also Comment,
Antitrust and Patents: Government's Standing to Challenge Patents in Antitrust Actions, 58
MnN. L. REv. 307, 310 (1973) ("The government may now elect to attack the validity of a
patent if it is sufficiently related to an antitrust violation without waiting for it to be asserted as
a defense."); Keith J. Kanouse, Case Comment, 48 NoRa DAME LAW. 1355, 1361-62 (1973)
(arguing that Glaxo impliedly overrules Bell Telephone, 167 U.S. 224 (1897), since Bell Tele-
phone expressly denied the right of government to collaterally attack without fraud or deceit,
and that Glaxo allows what is denied by statute); K. Gregory Erwin, Recent Developments, 8
TEx. INT'L. L.J. 421, 430 (1973) (The courts have consistently reduced the restrictions on
challenging patents.). The criteria for challenging patents that emerged from Glaxo was that
patents must be directly involved in antitrust violations; effective relief must involve restric-
tions on the patents involved; and the government must establish a substantial case for this
relief. Id. at 428.
282 See Kilgore, supra note 178, at 118.
COMPULSORY ROYALTY-FREE LICENSING
These causes of action, and others which might result in remedies affect-
ing patent rights,283 are often just as necessary to prevent assaults on the
integrity of the patent process as restraints of trade.284 Moreover, even
though they alleviate some of the burden on the Patent Office, "the op-
portunities for collusion and fraud are obvious, primarily in [settlements
of] interference proceedings; '28 -5 hence, agreements made between par-
ties prosecuting competing patent applications are particularly offensive
to the courts. 286 The chances are great that parties to settlements are
conspiring to avoid the requirement of prior art disclosure in direct dero-
gation of the purpose of the patent system in order to restrain trade.28 7
Justice White suggested in Singer that termination of an interference
should at least presumptively constitute an illegal restraint of trade.288
"Any hope for a permanent solution along these lines [, however, is]
highly speculative," 289 largely because most such terminations are
innocent:
[T]here is reason to believe that, unable for that reason
[(that litigation is expensive)], to defend a . . . patent
283 It has also been argued, for example, that regardless of the materiality to the granting
of a patent, any deliberate misrepresentation made with intent to affect the examiner's deci-
sion should constitute an unfair act or practice sufficient to invoke antitrust jurisdiction. See
generally Carney, supra note 139. In addition, the enforcement of a patent which was pro-
cured by false statements may constitute a tort actionable in state court. See, e.g., Becher v.
Contoure Lab., 279 U.S. 388 (1929) (state court had jurisdiction to determine that a patent
owner improperly stole an idea invented by plaintiff even though necessary result was invali-
dation of patent); Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897) (state courts are
competent to adjudicate the validity of a patent when that issue is raised collaterally); Crucible
Chem. Co. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 423 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1992); Coleman v. Whistnat, 35
S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1945) (state court has jurisdiction in contract or tort action with respect to
patent rights or the exercise of patent rights). But see Miller v. Lucas, 51 Cal.App.3d 774
(1975) (where only act alleged was filing of possibly fraudulent applications with patent office,
state court has no jurisdiction).
284 See Abraham S. Greenburg, Present Trends in Collateral Attacks on Patent Validity,
24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 746, 754 (1942); see also William H. Bryant, Fraudulent Patent Pro-
curement as an Unfair Method of Competition, 16 STAN L. REv. 729, 732 (1964) (The most
effective remedy to correct serious restraints of trade and restore competition may often be
royalty-free licensing.).
285 Improperly Procured Note, supra note 239, at 1508; see also Jerrold G. Van Cise,
Antitrust Laws and Patents, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 776, 784 (1970) ("Ihe effect of interfer-
ence settlements by contending patent applicants ... [may] result in the grant of patents based
on how best to dominate an industry rather than who in fact made the inventions involved").
286 "Evidence that Congress shares the judicial distrust of patent interference settlements
is reflected by section 135(c) of the Patent Code ... which requires any agreement or under-
standing between parties to an interference [in connection with the interference] to be filed
with the Patent Office." Sigmund Timberg, Antitrust Aspects of Patent Litigation, Arbitration
and Settlement, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 244, 253-54 (1977).
287 See Joseph S. Iandiorio, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Laws, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
712, 743 (1964).
288 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 200 (1963); see also Iandiorio, supra
note 287 at 243-44.
289 Improperly Procured Note, supra note 239, at 1508.
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suit, many [potential competitors] capitulate to a well fi-
nanced patentee without litigating; the result is that
many patents, which are 'spurious'-i.e., would proba-
bly not stand up in court, if contested-confer, in actual
fact.... monopolies which are as effective... as if they
had been judicially held valid.... But the exploitation
of such a monopoly should not turn on such fortuitous
circumstances. 290
Once obtained, fraudulently procured patents may be used to harass and
intimidate competitors and customers of potential competitors with
suits291 or threats of suits. 292 The fact that patents used to restrain trade
may rest on spurious grounds becomes secondary for competitors. The
expense of establishing that fact in the courts is usually prohibitive for
those against whom these "weapons" are employed. 293 Thus, patentees
can capitalize on the understandable reluctance of competitors and cus-
tomers in becoming involved in expensive and burdensome patent litiga-
tion.294 Even without actually suing customers, the owner of a
fraudulently induced patent may dry up a competitor's potential market
by placing its product under a cloud. 295 There may also be multiple pat-
ents on which royalties must be paid during the substantial amount of
time it takes for new entrants to develop their own patents in order to
290 Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641-42 (2d Cir. 1942).
291 See, e.g., Handguards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984) (court
upheld jury verdict finding that a patent suit was prosecuted in bad faith due in part because
the patentee had knowledge that the patent was invalid), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985);
W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 381 F. Supp. 680, 698-99 (D. Del. 1974) (patentee
offered to abandon patent infringement suit in exchange for licensing agreement); see also
supra note 159.
292 The effect of illegal harassment through threats of litigation is ameliorated, however,
because 35 U.S.C. § 287 requires patentees to notify infringers of their acts of infringement as
a prerequisite to the recovery of damages. Thus, a patentee is encouraged to give prior notifi-
cation to customers. See Mark S. Bicks, Threatening to Sue For Patent Infringement: Unfair
Competition and Antitrust Consequences, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 302, 302 (1977).
293 See Joseph Borkin, Patents and the New Trust Problem, 7 LAw & Corrau. PROBS.
74, 77 (1940). The patent suit had long been one of the most effective weapons in the continu-
ation of the dominance of two companies in the drug field. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mc-
Kesson & Robbins, Inc., American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966) (No.
15805).
294 Judge Posner has recognized that "[m]any claims not wholly groundless would never
be sued on their own sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning, would be too
low to repay the investment in litigation .... [It may then be inferred] that the plaintiff wants
to hurt a competitor not by getting a judgment against him, which would be a proper objective,
but just by the maintenance of the suit, regardless of its outcome." See Arquit, supra note 30,
at 746-47 (citing Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983)).
295 See David L. Ladd, Business Aggression Under the Patent System, 26 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
353, 362-67 (1959). See generally Michael Paul Chu, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave
of Predatory Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341 (1992).
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avoid extensive and expensive litigation.296 Meanwhile, even though in-
terrelated patents may be necessary to avoid technical difficulties, 297 li-
censing costs can become prohibitive, especially when combined with
the additional capital outlay necessary to engage heavily entrenched
defendants.
Cross-licensing arrangements between dominant producers also
have a unique potential for the suppression of competition, the deteriora-
tion of consumer purchasing power and the development of monop-
oly.298 The division and control of royalties gives the licensor power to
control the market and tends to show a purpose to restrain trade.299 The
dangers and likelihood of price collusion are accentuated when there are
high barriers against entry such as restrictive patent arrangements. 300
Therefore, if challenged patent licensing arrangements vest the combina-
tion with power to restrain trade, this is sufficient to bring the combina-
tion within the scope of the antitrust laws,30 1 and remedies directed at
patentees are appropriate if necessary to free potential new entrants from
any possibility of charges of infringement. 30 2
Antitrust remedies calculated to eliminate threats of infringement
litigation are likely in situations where new entrants are seeking to com-
pete in a high research industry and when, in addition to willful conceal-
ment of prior art, a court is disturbed by the deliberateness of the conduct
296 See Kilgore, supra note 178, at 105; see also Bryant, supra note 284.
297 See id. at 18, 20.
298 See United States v. General Ele. Co., 82 F. Supp 753, 799 (D.N.J. 1949); Borkin I,
supra note 186, at 724.
299 See Van Cise, supra note 285. It is, however, not the presence of any single element
of restraint so much as it is the entire collection of factors which threatens the security of the
other members of an industry that creates the antitrust violation. See WooD, PATENTS AND
ANTrRusT LAW 106 (1942).
300 See JOE STATEN BAIN, INDusTRiAL ORGANIZATION 240-43 (1959).
301 United States v. General Instrument Corp., 115 F. Supp. 582 (D.N.J. 1953).
302 "Patent interchanges must be the key that opens the door to competition, not the bolt
that bars it." Iandiorio, supra note 287, at 742. Interference settlements and resulting cross-
licensing agreements which do more than stipulate who is to receive the patent and grant
nonexclusive license to each of the parties may also be open to scrutiny and a proper circum-
stance for compulsory licensing. See Frank Adam Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co.,
146 F.2d 165, 167 (8th Cir. 1945) ("A court of equity will not lend its aid to protect a patent
monopoly when the owner of the patent is using it as an effective means of restraining compe-
tition with its sale of an unpatented article."); Davis, Patent Licensing and the Antitrust Laws:
Some Recent Developments, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 12, 37 (1964); see also Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944). "'Where an important public interest would be
prejudiced,' the reasons for denying injunctive relief 'may be compelling.' .. . That is the
principle which has led this Court in the past to withhold aid from the patentee in suits for
either direct or indirect infringement where the patent was being misused." Id.
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before the patent examiner. 30 3 Under these circumstances, 3° 4 the Justice
Department often requests relief in the form of royalty-free licensing.
3 05
New competitors require assistance of a substantial nature to enable them
to overcome the lead-time which defendants reap from unlawful ac-
tions,306 and even under favorable circumstances, they might not find a
market.
Antitrust remedies are a late cure for conditions which have festered
for a long time and have been profitable for those responsible. These
303 See Lawrence R. Hefter, An Applicant's Duty to Disclose Prior Art, 45 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 128, 129 (1963). Such relief is not objectionable as confiscatory and punitive if the
situation is serious enough to require the remedy. See also Improperly Procured Note, supra
note 239, at 1505.
Despite the intimations of Hartford-Empire and National Lead there would seem to
be no serious constitutional barrier to such orders in judicial antitrust decrees. The
only cases cited in Hartford-Empire as raising possible constitutional problems held
that a patent is property which may not be taken for public use without compensa-
tion. Here, however, where the patents are being taken not for public use but as
remedy for unfair practices, the only substantive constitutional issue would be
whether there is a rational connection between the offense and the remedy.
Id. at 1518.
304 As part of its obligation to avoid charges of overreaching, in that the government's
Patent Office "gave" and the Justice Department (or the FTC) would be "taking away," the
government is on even more sympathetic ground in asking for invalidation when bringing
newly discovered matter before the court because it is logical to repudiate a bargain for fraud,
and suppression of facts known to the applicant might well be considered fraud. See Harris,
supra note 134, at 48; Improperly Procured Note, supra note 239, at 1515.
305 See Bryant, supra note 284. In In re American Cyanamid Co, 63 F.T.C. 1747 (1963),
for example, the Justice Department argued (and the FTC held) that the totality of the paten-
tee's behavior amounted to a violation of Section 5 and that the Commission had jurisdiction
to remedy the non-competitive situation by ordering compulsory royalty-free licensing to re-
store competition. The validity of the patent was not at issue but the FTC's proposed order
would have prohibited one defendant from any enforcement of its patent rights (compulsory
royalty-free licensing) because any vindication of rights related to the patent would inappropri-
ately imply legitimacy: "the essence of the violation stems from the possession of a patent
monopoly which [the defendant] has no standing or right to exert in view of the means by
which it was obtained." Memorandum in Support of Proposed Form of Order Relating to
Patents at 7, In re American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747 (1963) (No. 7211). In the Memo-
randum in Support of the Proposed Form of Order, id., the FTC, in discussing the argument
that royalty-free licensing is confiscatory, pointed out that only if anti-competitive effects can-
not otherwise be eliminated, would royalty-free licensing be appropriate. (In National Lead,
for example, free licensing would have been confiscatory. The patents used to violate the
Sherman Act were valid, untainted by inequitableness or fraud.) However, where a patentee
obtains a patent through inequitable conduct before the patent office, no question of confisca-
tion of property rights can exist, and disallowing enforcement of a patent is a reasonable non-
penal disposition. See id. at 8. Under these circumstances, since the patentee can never purge
itself of the fraudulent conduct, royalty-free licensing will often be the best way to dissipate
the anti-competitive effects of the fraudulent patent. See id. at 11. Where only "misuse" is at
issue, there is somewhat more confusion over whether or not to engage in royalty-free licens-
ing when framing an effective antitrust decree. See generally Roland W. Donnem, The Anti-
trust Attack on Restrictive Patent License Provisions, 14 A'rrrmUST BuLL. 749 (1969).
306 Reply to Pfizer's & Cyanamid's Memorandum in Opposition to a Further Order at 12,
In re American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747 (1963) (No. 7211).
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conditions have developed a power of resistance to change not readily
overcome. So long as patents are not canceled and licensing is not or-
dered on a non-restrictive basis, patentees continue to be free to grant or
withhold licenses at their pleasure. The striking of one set of restrictive
license conditions may only lead to the adoption of another set of condi-
tions which achieve the same anticompetitive result.30 7 Thus, difficulties
new entrants may have in competing with a large or dominant defendant
must often be neutralized by giving potential competitors a more
favorable position.30 8 Consequently, courts penalize patentees who vio-
late antitrust laws by denying enforcement, 30 9 as well as by compelling
the grant of industry wide licenses. 310
Fraudulently obtained patents, however, not only restrain the free
economy the patent clause sought to foster,311 but defeat the fundamental
purpose of the patent system.312 Thus, fraud in obtaining patents later
found to have been used to restrain trade should easily dictate a policy of
even more expansive compulsory licensing than might be justified in re-
habilitating anti-competitive situations resulting simply from misuse of a
valid patent.313
[T]here is a distinction between a patent invalid for
wrongful procurement and a situation where valid pat-
307 This, of course, will be ineffective in breaking up the monopoly. See Compulsory
Patent Note, supra note 276, at 82.
308 See Marcus, supra note 174, at 36-51. A key public policy objective with regard to
patent matters is competition in the making as well as the marketing of new inventions. See
George E. Frost, The Case Against Drug Patent Compulsory Licensing, 7 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. Ras. & EDUC. 84, 89 (1963).
309 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
310 See Benton Baker, Patent Rights and the Antitrust Laws, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 688
(1952). In most cases of compulsory licensing, patents were used in connection with practices
not contemplated by the patent laws. That is, some defendants have been guilty of misuse of
patents as part of antitrust violations. See Kilgore, supra note 178, at 138. The patentee's
business practices created a monopoly and this remedy became necessary. See Moore, supra
note 177, at 233.
311 See Borkin I, supra note 186, at 723.
It is necessary that we constantly remind ourselves of the original intention of the
patent law, i.e., to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. In furtherance
of this objective, the Constitution provided for an exception to the principles of com-
mon law, which consistently condemned monopoly in the economic system.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942)
("IT]he promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts is the 'main object'; reward of
inventors is secondary and merely a means to that end.").
312 Only in the event that an invention contributes to progress in the sciences or useful
arts is the patentee entitled to reward because this is the fundamental purpose of the patent
system. Masonite, 316 U.S. at 278.
313 See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 200 (1963) (White, J., concur-
ring). The Supreme Court has tended to treat similar business arrangements differently be-
cause of differences not material to the economic consequences of the arrangements. "IT]his
Court has quite consistently refused to allow the form into which the parties chose to cast the
transaction to govern." Id.
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ents have been used to [monopolize. Prior] cases hesi-
tated in granting [royalty-free licensing] as the patents
were otherwise [valid, but it may be the] only logical
remedy for an improperly procured patent, since it alone
would put the patentee in the position [it] would have
been in if the Patent Office had detected the improper
conduct in the first place.3 14
This reasoning, however, does not fully address the objection that an
antitrust decree is supposed to suppress economic restraints and restore
economic equilibrium, not cure infractions against the Patent Office.
Nevertheless, where the Sherman Act is involved "the crucial fact is the
impact of the particular practice on competition" 3 15 and the Antitrust Di-
vision does have the jurisdiction to both enforce the Sherman Act316 and
sue to cancel a patent.3 17 Whether it appears that the Sherman Act has
been violated by procurement or by misuse of a patent which should not
have even been granted, a single decree should be able to cure the entire
situation; especially where the same conspiracy that restrained competi-
tion-intentional patent fraud-is also a potential ground for
cancellation. 318
Finally, it should be remembered that, inevitably and unavoidably,
patents impose a burden of higher prices on the public. 319 Patentees'
rights, however, should not impose price uniformity and market rigidity
314 See Improperly Procured Note, supra note 239, at 1519; see also Bryant, supra note
284.
315 FrC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 397 (1953).
316 15 U.S.C. §4 (1992).
317 See supra notes 43-50, 95.
318 Tribunals that decide an antitrust case brought on behalf of the public should possess
relief powers equal to those available in suits between private parties, and vice-versa. Report
of the Attorney-General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 258 (1955). The
most appropriate steps under the particular circumstances must be taken to cure the effects of
illegal conduct and assure the public freedom from its continuance. One justification for an
antitrust remedy is the removal of violations. See Gilbertvijle Trucking Co. v. United States,
371 U.S. 115 (1962). However, as noted in Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S.
110, 128 (1948):
Divestiture or dissolution must take account of the present and future conditions in
the particular industry as well as past violations. It serves several functions: (1) It
puts an end to the combination or conspiracy when that is itself the violation. (2) It
deprives the antitrust defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy. (3) It is designed
to break up or render impotent the monopoly power which violates the Act. (empha-
sis added).
Therefore, antitrust remedies may include depriving a violator of the weapons used to make
his conduct effective through royalty-free licensing. See, e.g., United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 188 (1944); Chain Institute, Inc. v. FTC, 246 F.2d 231, 235
(8th Cir. 1957).
319 See Tom Arnold & Paul Janicke, Compulsory Licensing Anyone?, 55 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y. 149, 156 (1973) (includes a proposed statute for compulsory licensing after a four year
period from the date of filing, making an action pursuable by a prospective licensee).
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in total disregard of the interest of consumers in obtaining vital products
at reasonable prices.320 While higher prices may be the legitimate and
unavoidable cost of encouraging technological advancements, if patents
should never have been issued, the public is unjustifiably encumbered
unless any resulting illegal monopoly is rooted out and competitive pric-
ing re-established. The use of compulsory patent licensing to re-estab-
lish competitive pricing still involves the fixing and paying of royalties
and may be inadequate in eliminating the unlawful control over the mar-
ket.321 Dedication, which makes all patent rights permanently available
to the public, is essentially cancellation or divestiture without compensa-
tion. It provides no incentive for a defendant to aid in restoring competi-
tion and imposes a permanent loss. Thus, dedication can only be
imposed if essential to prevent and restrain violations and restore
competition.322
The imposition of temporary, royalty-free licensing, however, can
effectively free competition in a given industry without permanently de-
priving the patentee of its patent rights,3 23 an approach which would be
presumptively inappropriate in antitrust decrees. 324 Such relief encour-
ages a defendant to share technology and aid in restoring competition
through the incentive of a return to full patent rights and privileges once
illegal restraints are ended. Therefore, when a case does not warrant
dedication (that is, it does not meet the narrow criteria of General Elec-
tric325 ) royalty-free licensing may have significant tactical advantages
over dedication, divestiture, or compulsory reasonable royalties.
The proper occasions for the use of royalty-free licensing are rea-
sonably easy to discern. First, a decree ordering royalty-free licensing
must be essential to prevent future unlawful practices as well as undo the
effects of past conduct. Royalty-free licensing is most justifiable, from a
public policy point of view, in antitrust litigation in which the only effec-
tive way to treat the results of unlawful conduct is by barring conduct-
the collection of reasonable royalties-which would otherwise allow un-
320 Before the FTC acted in American Cyanamid, for example, the wholesale and retail
prices for the drug at issue in Italy, where there was heavy competition, were about 25 percent
of its price in the U.S. See Improperly Procured Note, supra note 239, at 1509-11.
321 See generally Compulsory Licensing Note, supra note 230 and cases cited.
322 Since dedication as opposed to royalty-free licensing is primarily penal in nature, it
should rarely be used in an antitrust decree. See Moore, supra note 177, at 239. Otherwise,
dedication permanently penalizes the patentee for past wrongs without necessarily effectuating
a restoration of competition. See also United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); text ac-
companying supra note 260.
323 See Compulsory Licensing Note, supra note 230, at 547.
324 See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FrC, 327
U.S. 608 (1946); text accompanying supra note 129.
325 United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); see supra note
201 and accompanying text.
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lawful economic effects to continue unmitigated. 326 Where patents have
simply been "misused" to illegally monopolize, courts have hesitated in
granting royalty-free licensing and limiting property rights because pat-
ent use and not validity was being attacked; 327 but if a patent in issue is
found to be fraudulently procured, the existence and exercise of patent
rights for a long time may warrant more than a mere injunction that fu-
ture royalties be reasonable.328
Second, the alternative of dedication must be unreasonable. For ex-
ample, if competition would be impeded by permanently removing a de-
fendant's patent rights, then imposing a reasonable, temporary loss of the
fruits of the patentee's fraud (and weapons of unfair competition) would
be more appropriate. More often than not, dedication will be unreasona-
bly punitive rather than remedial. 329 In Hartford-Empire,330 for instance,
the defendant produced nothing; it was mainly a patent holding and li-
censing company engaged in research and development. 331 Even poten-
tial and existing licensees took the position that reasonable royalty
licensing was preferable to dedication. 332 The peculiar economic situa-
tion in the industry made continued research important, and the eco-
nomic health of all those in the affected industry was largely dependant
upon a continuation of royalties. 333 In many cases, even defendants have
believed that royalty-free licensing was to their economic advantage as
compared to dedication. 334
Third, the fixing of reasonable royalties must be difficult. This
would be the case where royalties have not been established or, in look-
ing at total conduct, none can reasonably be estimated. 335 Fourth, be-
326 Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 860-61 (6th Cir. 1964).
327 See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
328 See Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965). It may not even be clear what
"reasonable" means under these circumstances.
329 See id.
330 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
331 United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 594 (N.D. Ohio 1942), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
332 See Hartford-Empire Co., 323 U.S. at 437.
333 See Kilgore, supra note 178, at 117.
334 See id.
335 See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 349 (1947); see also FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1922); United States v. American Optical Co.,
95 F. Supp. 771,776 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). In infringement cases, for example, where the plaintiff
has neither manufactured the patented product nor licensed others at an established royalty
rate, the court must hypothesize a reasonable royalty upon which the parties would have
agreed prior to the commencement of the infringement. See Trilogy Communications, Inc. v.
Comm Scope Co., 754 F. Supp. 468, 512 (W.D.N.C. 1990); Ellipse Corp. v. Ford Motor Corp.,
461 F. Supp. 1354, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd., 614 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 939 (1980). In setting a royalty, courts must discern and consider every economic
factor that normally prudent entrepreneurs would consider under similar circumstances. See
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert.
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cause of extremely entrenched advantages, cessation of the offending
activity must be essential, and the likelihood must be high that, as a re-
sult of imposing this remedy, the defendant cannot again resume the
same or a related activity.336 Often,
advantages already in hand may be held by methods
more subtle and informed, and more difficult to prove,
than those which, in the first place, win a market. When
the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear viola-
tion of law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled
roads to that end be left open and that only the worn one
be closed.337
Royalty-free licensing seems appropriate, therefore, in an infant industry
where permitting any licensing is likely to invite continued abuses
through stealth and concealment.
Fifth, the factual circumstances must be such as to allow any decree
to be precise in intent, reasoning, and application. Courts must provide
clear indications of why royalty-free licensing is necessary to end unfair
competition, and any decree must explain why specific economic viola-
tions are deemed serious enough for the remedy used. Thus, if enforce-
ment becomes necessary, the actions to be taken must be clear.
Sixth, where continued enforcement of a patent is deemed economi-
cally necessary even though it would have the practical effect of continu-
ing a restraint of trade, thete should be no remedy more effective (or
equally effective but less punitive) in removing the violation. Evidence
of a continuing restraint of trade that is sufficiently detrimental to the
public so as to require royalty-free licensing, for example, might be
maintaining rigid prices on patented products in spite of a steady price
decline displayed by similar unpatented products. Increasingly efficient
production methods, coupled with the persistent competitive pressures
resulting from free entry, should make possible an ultimate decrease in
the price of what are often extremely vital products. 338
The problem, however, is not solely a lack of criteria for the appli-
cation of royalty-free licensing. Resources (and political support) for the
antitrust agencies and the Patent Office, those entities ordinarily en-
trusted to discover and eliminate patent fraud and illegal control over
denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) (setting forth factors to be considered under what has become
known as the "analytical approach"); see also TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d
895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
336 See, e.g., Country Tweeds, Inc. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that
the FTC order must be specifically directed at eliminating the unlawful conduct); Swanee
Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833, 838 (2d Cir. 1961).
337 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947).
338 See Henry Steele, Monopoly and Competition in the Ethical Drugs Market, 5 J.L. &
EcoN. 131, 138 (1962).
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markets, are increasingly diminishing.3 39 At the same time, the market
for the products of modem technology and the corollary economic incen-
tives to obtain patents at any cost are greatly increasing. 340 This suggests
that the government is losing its ability (if it has not already been lost) to
control unfair competition achieved through largely undetected, spurious
patents, and to protect consumers from unnecessarily exorbitant prices
for the wide array of technology-dependent commodities which have be-
come vital to our society.
In practice, virtually the only limits the government (or potential
competitors) can impose on this behavior are those limits the corpora-
tions engaged in patent fraud to further illegal monopolies will accept
(through consent decrees). 341 This sad circumstance raises a question
that is-at least in the area of patent-fraud antitrust-not unreasonable:
does the government still have any capacity to regulate corporate patent
practices or have corporations finally, insidiously, gained effective con-
trol over the governmental processes designed to control them? 342
It would seem that judicial support for, and protection of, consum-
ers' and competitors' rights through the antitrust laws is the only real
guarantee that entrepreneurs will conform their patent (and Patent Office)
behavior to law. Both the incentives and the ability to enforce antitrust
laws have substantially diminished within the political branches since the
1960s, 343 when the Supreme Court confirmed the legitimacy, under
proper circumstances, of both patent fraud antitrust claims344 and com-
pulsory royalty-free licensing as an equitable remedy.345 Yet, notwith-
standing the urgent need for the vigorous maintenance and reinforcement
of such claims and remedies to protect the American public from corpo-
rate patent predation, the contemporary judicial solicitude toward patents
and patent rights continues to prevail.346
Defendants in patent infringement cases, for example, assert fraudu-
lent procurement or enforcement of patents as affirmative defenses as a
matter of course.347 By 1989, however, only one decision had been re-
ported in which an alleged infringer obtained recovery for a litigated
Sherman Act offense involving inequitable conduct of any kind, "and
339 See supra notes 5, 8-11, 277-80 and accompanying text.
340 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 2-3, 20-22 and accompanying text.
343 See supra notes 5, 8-11, 277-80 and accompanying text.
344 See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
345 See supra notes 182-207.
346 See, e.g., Sobel, supra note 172.
347 See generally Wm. Marshall Lee, Proving a Walker Process Antitrust Claim, 59 ATrr-
TRUST L.J. 661 (1991).
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that was not the usual fraud. '3 48 Cases in which antitrust claims have
been premised on patent fraud "have almost always failed, [particularly]
when the claim has been based on alleged misconduct other than tradi-
tional fraud; '349 where antitrust liability on counterclaims to infringe-
ment suits has been imposed under Walker Process, the patentee's
conduct was so egregious that it left no doubt that the infringement suit
was objectively baseless.350
There continues to be, therefore, much danger to consumers (and
free trade) posed by patent fraud. Decreasing resources are available to
combat the problem, and important public policies militate in favor of the
use of compulsory-free licensing as an antitrust remedy. As a conse-
quence, the Federal Circuit should revitalize Walker Process claims by
348 Sobel, supra note 172, at 694 (citing Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron,
Inc., 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977) (liability found based on patentee's retention of a retired
Patent Office examiner to assist in a reissue application where he had been involved in the
original patent application).
349 1 WLiAM C. HoLmas, INTEua.cruAL PRioPxITY Am ANTusT LAW, § 15.03, at
15-17 (1983). Cases succeeding in imposing antitrust liability based upon the enforcement of
fraudulently or inequitably procured patents include: Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati
Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 1977) (same violation manifested intention.., to
the same degree as if the original patent had been procured by fraud") (liability found based on
patentee's retention of a retired Patent Office examiner to assist in reissue application where he
had been involved in the original patent application); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings &
Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 595 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972) (violation
of proscriptions against conflicts of interest involved "the same threat to the public interest as
actual fraud" upon the Patent Office); Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969); Arcade, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Co., No.
CIV-I-88-141, 1991 WL 429344 (E.D. Tenn., Jun. 7, 1991); Conceptual Engineering Assocs.,
Inc. v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262 (D.R.I. 1989); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). There are also several cases in which a Walker
Process claim has survived a motion for summary judgment or dismissal even though the
claims were not adjudicated. See, e.g., Buehler AG v. Ocrim, S.P.A., 1992-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,077 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (survived motion for summary judgment); Grid Systems
Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (survived motion to
dismiss); Burbank Aeronautical Corp. H v. Aeronatical Dev. Corp., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1069 (C.D.
Cal. 1990) (survived motion for summary judgment); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem.
Co., 635 F. Supp. 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (survives motion for summary judgment).
350 See, e.g., Arcade, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Co., No. CIV-1-88-141, 1991
WL 429344 (E.D. Tenn., Jun. 7, 1991); Conceptual Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Aelectronic Bond-
ing, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262 (D.R.I. 1989); see also Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake
Mktg., 45 F.3d 1550 (Fed Cir. 1995); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15
F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417 (Fed.
Cir. 1989); Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Argus
Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Kimberly Clark
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984); E.I. duPont de Nemours v.
Berkley & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1979); Norton Co. v. Carborundum Co., 530 F.2d
435 (3d Cir. 1976); Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1976);
Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1975); RoB-
ERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND aTm FEDERAL Cmcurr §9.5(a), at 285 (2d ed. 1991) ("the
[courts are] disinclined to uphold on inequitable conduct defense in the absence of truly egre-
gious conduct").
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carving out exceptions to their general solicitude toward patents. These
exceptions might take the form of reducing the degree of the dichotomy
between "inequitable conduct" (a relatively new, subtle judicial re-char-
acterization of certain quasi-fraudulent behavior), and customary patent
fraud, allowing both to support antitrust claims.3 51 In the alternative, the
judges of that Circuit might consider reducing the stringency of the test
for holding "misrepresentations" to the Patent Office sufficiently mate-
rial to invoke Walker Process antitrust jurisdiction,352 or treat omissions
of prior art as they do misrepresentations of prior art. Even assuming
that much of the antitrust jurisprudence of the 1960s may now fairly be
characterized as misguided, 353 the potential danger to consumers, and the
important public policies that flow from the contemporary judicial failure
to provide exceptions to present doctrine in the area of patent fraud anti-
trust, is enormous.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust decrees should go no further than reasonably necessary
under the circumstances to correct restraints on free trade or reserve the
351 The dichotomy would seem to have been established by 1972, with the strict reading
of Walker Process found in Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972); see Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in a case where an antitrust plaintiff successfully
proved fraud, the court indicated that there is an important "difference between inequitable
conduct that may render a patent unenforceable and intentional fraud that may lead to antitrust
liability."); see also Pro-Mold and Tool Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Preservation Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801 (Fed Cir.
1990); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Baush & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Kings-
down Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (inequitable
conduct rendering a patent unenforceable is broader than common law fraud and includes not
only affirmative misrepresentation but half-truths or omissions with intent to deceive); FMC
Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-
Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987); E.I. duPont de Nemours v. Berkley & Co., 620
F.2d 1247, 1274 (8th Cir. 1980) ("inequitable conduct short of fraud can be a defense in a
patent infringement suit" but cannot support an antitrust claim for damages and other injunc-
tive relief'beneficial to the public); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th
Cir. 1984); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d 514, 521 (5th
Cir. 1975).
352 The requirement of a showing of the "but for" materiality required for fraud under
antitrust law is more stringent than the showing required to render a patent unenforceable
based on inequitable conduct in the Patent Office. Compare Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson
Chem. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (S.D. Tex. 1986), and Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid
State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[m]ateriality is shown if 'but for' the
misrepresentation, the patent would not have issued"), with Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharma-
cal, Inc. 873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Materiality [for inequitable conduct] may be
established. . . by a showing that a reasonable examiner would consider the withheld prior art
important in deciding whether to issue the patent.") (emphasis added). But see Carney, supra
note 139.
353 See Hughes, supra note 25.
COMPULSORY ROYALTY-FREE LICENSING
rights of competitors and the public;3 54 where patents are being restricted
as a remedy for unfair practices, there must be a rational connection be-
tween the offense and the remedy. However, if important public policies
are to be effectuated, deliberate misrepresentations made with the intent
to affect a Patent Office decision should be considered an unfair method
of competition, even if standards for what constitutes a misrepresentation
must be relaxed.355 If evidence of facts unknown to the Patent Examiner
is adduced in an antitrust prosecution tending to show an illegal conspir-
acy to obtain an invalid patent, the complainant should be able to de-
mand an equitable and appropriate antitrust remedy,356 and compulsory
royalty-free licensing will often be just such a remedy.
In the recent past, there has been much resistance to patent antitrust
enforcement, 357 and thus a somewhat spare use of royalty-free licensing
as a remedy for fraudulent procurement of patents. The extreme forms
of economic abuse that flow from patent fraud, however, so basically
violate the fundamental policy behind the patent and antitrust laws that
the importance and crucial utility of Walker Process claims should be
firmly acknowledged and re-vitalized; ideally, this form of litigation
should be resuscitated and reinforced.
As a result, compulsory royalty-free licensing should be more fre-
quently imposed-not only through consent decrees, but in litigated
Walker Process cases-in light of the serious consequences patent fraud
presents for freedom of competition and the ability of our society to con-
354 See United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
355 Recently, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed itself on the issue of Walker Process liability so as to expand that cause of action
drastically. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., No. 96-1463, 1998 WL 122399
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 1998). Last November, that Court had held that Walker Process liability
cannot be based on a patent applicant's knowing failure to cite a prior art reference because,
while applicants owe a duty of candor to the PTO, Walker Process cases traditionally distin-
guish between omissions and affirmative misrepresentations, and imposing antitrust liability
for failure to cite prior art would convert most patent infringement actions into antitrust cases.
See Patents-Antitrust Counterclaims, 66 U.S.L.W. 1384 (1997). Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit has now "made an about-face on the substantive ... legal issue," holding that "a
fraudulent omission can be just as reprehensible as a fraudulent misrepresentation" and that,
assuming all other elements are present, both should allow for Walker Process liability. Fed-
eral Circuit Reconsiders, Says Omissions of Prior Art May Result in Antitrust Liability, 66
U.S.L.W. 1604 (1998).
356 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 IowA
L. REv. 371, 374 (1993):
Presumably, a perfectly efficient antitrust policy would minimize the total social
losses caused by monopoly rent seeking of the kind that is reachable under the anti-
trust laws. Antitrust would do this by minimizing the sum of (a) the costs to the
consumer imposed by monopoly pricing and output reduction; (b) the costs to the
monopolist of inefficient exclusionary practices; (c) the costs that inefficient exclu-
sionary practices impose on third parties; and (d) the costs of operating the system
that detects these things, adjudicates them, and punishes violators.
357 See supra notes 349-50 and accompanying text.
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trol corporate patentees. Free licensing is not punitive; it does not per-
manently remove title to intellectual property, and it is often necessary to
hold out sufficient incentive to defendants to actively aid in restoring
competition. Tribunals required to adjudicate antitrust matters and fash-
ion antitrust decrees must become more receptive to Walker Process
claims and exercise greater use of the unique remedy of royalty-free pat-
ent licensing if our society is to maintain any hope of preserving free
competition in future markets for technology-based goods or products.
